Side Channel Analysis of a Java-­based Contactless Smart Card by Mateos Santillan, Edgar
Side Channel Analysis of a 











presented to the University of Waterloo 
in fulfillment of the 
thesis requirement for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in 




Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2012 
 
 






I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, 
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. 





Smart cards are widely used in different areas of modern life including identification, 
banking, and transportation cards. Some types of cards are able to store data and 
process information as well. A number of them can run cryptographic algorithms to 
enhance the security of their transactions and it is usually believed that the information 
and values stored in them are completely safe. However, this is generally not the case 
due to the threat of the side channel. Side channel analysis is the process of obtaining 
additional information from the internal activity of a physical device beyond that 
allowed by its specifications. There exist different techniques to attempt to obtain 
information from a cryptosystem using other ways than the normally permitted. This 
thesis presents a series of experiments intended to study the side channel from a 
particular type of smart card, known as Java Cards. This investigation uses the 
well-known technique, Correlation Analysis, and a new type of side channel attack 
called fast correlation in the frequency domain to study the side channel of Java Cards. 
This research presents a giant magnetoresistor (GMR) probe and for the first time, this 
type of sensor is used to investigate the side channel. A novel setup designed for 
studying the side channel of smart cards is described and two metrics used to evaluate 
the analysis results are presented. After testing the GMR probe and methodology on 
electronic devices executing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), such as 8-bit 
microcontrollers and 128-bit AES implementations on FPGAs, these techniques were 
applied to analyse two different models of Java Cards working in the contactless mode. 
The results show that successful attacks on a software implementation of AES running 
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Smart cards are used in many areas of modern life. They are employed in credit, debit, 
identification, and transport cards. They can store data and some types of cards are able 
to process information as well. They are used in a wide range of applications such as 
banking, transportation, and identification. In transportation applications, contactless 
cards are typically used, whereas in banking applications, contact, contactless or dual 
interface cards may be used. Some cards run cryptographic algorithms to enhance the 
security of their transactions and it is generally believed that the information and values 
stored in them are completely safe. However, this is generally not the case due to the 
threat of the side channel. Side channel analysis is the process of obtaining additional 
information from the internal activity of a physical device beyond that allowed by its 
specifications. There exist different techniques to attempt to obtain information from a 
cryptosystem using other ways than the normally permitted. Side channels can be 
imperceptible like in the case where EM emissions from a device are captured, the power 
consumption of equipment is monitored or the acoustic signals from a mechanical gadget 
are recorded (Rohatgi, 2006). Hence, if the electromagnetic (EM) signals emitted by the 
cards during cryptographic computations leak information related to the data processed, 
an attacker might be able to take advantage of that information and reconstruct the secret 
key. This work studies the security of one type of smart card called Java Cards, 
particularly the models JCOP30 and JCOP41. 
The use of EM signals to retrieve information from electronic devices is nothing new. 
During World War II, the USA Army and Navy based their secure communications on an 
encrypting device call SIGTOT; nevertheless, the content of the message (or plaintext) 
could be determined examining the EM signals emitted by the machine (National 
Security Agency and Central Security Service, 1972). The U.S. National Security Agency 
in 1966, warned intelligence officers about possible information leakage through the use 
of the Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) on computers and console displays. The problem was 
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that the CRT radiated strong signals and it was possible to recover in real time, fully 
legible copies of the information displayed on the screen from hundreds of meters away 
(Boak, 1973). More recently, some attacks on contact-based smart cards have been 
reported in the literature (Kocher et al. 1999), (Messerges et al. 2002), (Vermoen et al. 
2007). Some attacks on contactless smart cards have been published in (Nohl and 
Plotz, 2007), (Koning et al. 2008), (Oswald and Paar, 2011) and they have motivated 
upgrades in the baseline of security. Card makers discontinued some models and replaced 
them by others certified in security labs (Mifare, 2008), (Mifare, 2011). These attacks 
have occurred to Mifare and DESFire specifications but not to Java Cards, until now. 
Attacking Java-based contactless cards present several challenges. They are powered by 
the card reader through an inducted EM field that helps to hide the tiny emanations from 
the IC of the card associated with cryptographic operations.  
Smart cards are so important that their security is continually being tested. Power 
analysis and electromagnetic (EM) power analysis are strong side channel methodologies 
used to analyze hardware and software implementations of cryptographic algorithms. 
First, differential power analysis (DPA) was presented using smart cards (Kocher et al. 
1999). From there a number of attacks have been reported using power analysis 
(Messerges et al. 2002), (Vermoen et al. 2007) and EM analysis (Quisquater and Samyde, 
2001), (Gandolfi et al. 2001), (Agrawal et al. 2002), (Nohl and Plotz, 2007). There are 
cases where the authors have extracted the chip from the card to better study the EM 
since the signal to noise ratio (SNR) was too small with the card intact. Hence, they were 
unable to obtain any information (Carluccio et al. 2005). In other works, the researchers 
produce their own card readers and circuits that can even emulate the smart cards (Kasper 
et al. 2007). Some researchers have used power analysis to study Java Cards like in 
(Vermoen et al. 2007) where they develop their own card reader, measured the power 
consumption using a special system call Inspector (Riscure, 2011) and created a library 
with all possible instructions with their respective power traces. In this case, the analysis 
of cryptographic algorithms like DES or RSA was out of their research scope. In other 
research (Sterckx, 2009), the author use power analysis to study the implementation of 
anonymous credentials on Java Card smart cards. They found that the unstable internal 
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clock made the traces strongly misaligned and impractical to attack. Another research 
(Berkes, 2008), does timing analysis on the contactless communication of Java Cards; 
however, EM side-channel analysis such as differential EM analysis (DEMA) was 
beyond their research scope. 
In some studies, authors have used reverse engineering to detect security weaknesses 
and attack them (Nohl and Plotz, 2007), (Koning et al. 2008). In one case, they removed 
the chip from the card, polished the chip, and took pictures of all layers from the circuit. 
Using image recognition software, they recovered the electronic diagram of the card. 
After analyzing the diagram they found that, the cryptocore consisted of a 16-bit random 
number generator that uses a constant initial condition and a 48-bit linear feedback shift 
register (LFSR) (Nohl and Plotz, 2007). In 2011, researchers used an analog demodulator 
to enhance the EM signals from the analyzed smart cards (Kasper et al. 2011). In 
(Oswald and Paar, 2011) the authors go farther by successfully attacking the hardware 
implementation of 3DES from the DESFire3ICD40 using an analog demodulator and EM 
correlation analysis in the time and frequency domain. 
One of the goals of this thesis is to study the security of Java Cards. For this purpose, a 
number of experiments are developed and analyses are performed searching for a 
possible side channel. Some of the experiments include the use of two models of Java 
Cards, JCOP30 and JCOP41, running a Java software implementation of AES. Unlike 
previous research where DESFire (Oswald and Paar, 2011) and Mifare Classic (Nohl and 
Plotz, 2007), (Koning et al. 2008) specifications have been attacked, Java Cards contain 
garbage collection services that the programmer cannot disable and these services 
automatically interrupt the program execution. Additionally, the overhead associated with 
the Java virtual machine makes the execution time extremely large compared with other 
types of cards or hardware implementations and crypto accelerators. Longer executing 
times increase the difficulties of searching for a possible side channel. This research uses 
the properties of the giant magnetoresistor (GMR) probe to acquire EM signals without 
the use of an additional analog demodulator or filter. All the signals studied use 




This thesis proposes a new experimental setup, analysis and set of metrics for studying 
the side channel from JCOP30 and JCOP41 Java Cards. First, a new type of side channel 
attack called fast correlation in the frequency domain is introduced and two metrics are 
detailed to evaluate the effectiveness of the side channel analysis. This type of analysis 
and the metrics are tested over different platforms and successfully recover the secret key 
on 8-bit and 128-bit systems. This attack based on fast correlation in the frequency 
domain was submitted to an international DPA competition (DPACv2), and resulted in 
the fastest attack among all entries. Among the fastest entries, it had the best success rate 
for 20,000 traces. For the first time a giant magnetoresistor (GMR) sensor was applied to 
acquire the side channel. These sensors are based on the magnetoresistance quantum 
mechanical effect discovered in the late 1980s to detect small magnetic fields. This probe 
(Mateos and Gebotys, 2011), successfully recovered the correct small part of the key 
from a microcontroller based system. Finally, a novel setup for Java Card analysis is 
described. It included the fabrication of a coordinate’s analysis table and the design of an 
electronic circuit able to trigger the oscilloscope after a pre-programmed sequence of 
instructions are sent from the computer to a commercial card reader (Chapter 6). Finally, 
using EM emissions acquired with the GMR and the proposed correlation analyses, the 
correct small part of the key was recovered from the unmodified Java Cards, JCOP30 and 
JCOP41, running a software implementation of AES (Chapter 7). 
1.2 Thesis Organization 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents a brief 
introduction to smart cards describing the processor cards and their characteristics. It 
covers contact cards, contactless cards, and dual interface cards like the Java Cards used 
for analysis later in this research. Additionally, it briefly describes the communication 
type A and type B protocols and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). 
An introduction to side channel analysis describing the principles for power analysis 
and electromagnetic (EM) power analysis is presented in Chapter 3. Three variations of 
correlation analysis are explained, specifically correlation analysis in the time domain, 
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correlation analysis in the frequency domain and fast correlation in the frequency 
domain. Then, two new metrics Accuracy and Estimation are presented. These metrics 
are used in this research to evaluate the effectiveness of side channel analysis. At the end 
of the Chapter 3, some preliminary results are reported using a microcontroller base 
system that is running a software implementation of AES. The EM traces used in the 
analysis were acquired using an inductive probe. Some of the experiments described 
include EM analysis using different clock frequencies, random misalignments and 
comparing the results of the three types of correlation analysis (time domain, frequency 
domain and fast correlation) using accuracy as a metric. Also previously published power 
traces from the DPA book WS3 (Mangard et al. 2010b) were analyzed with the new 
proposed correlation approaches.  
An overview of the DPA Contest Version 2 (DPACv2) is reported in Chapter 4. The 
characteristics of the contest and the criteria used to compare the attack submissions are 
explained. Then, a brief report of the results of the DPACv2 and the analysis of the power 
traces from the DPACv2 public database are presented. 
A new type of EM probe is described in Chapter 5, based upon a giant magnetoresistor 
GMR sensor. The performance from this probe is compared with a commercial inductive 
probe. The evaluations include analysis in the time and frequency domain with different 
sampling rates, (500 MS/s, 250 MS/s, 125 MS/s and 50 MS/s) when a software 
implementation of AES is running in a microcontroller based system. 
The experimental setup designed to study the Java Cards used in this research is 
described in Chapter 6. First, a few modifications that were made to a commercial dual 
interface card reader to improve the quality of EM acquisitions are explained. Then, the 
functionality of an electronic circuit designed to demodulate the command from the card 
reader to trigger the digital oscilloscope used for capturing the EM traces is described. 
Then, two Java applets used for testing the security of the Java Cards are described, 
followed by an overview of the way the traces are acquired including one experiment 




A summary with the most representative results from this research is presented in 
Chapter 7. First, the results of an experiment where the IC was removed from the 
JCOP30 card are shown, followed by experiments using the JCOP30 and JCOP41 cards. 
In this case, the cards used had no physical modifications. All the EM traces were 
acquired using a GMR probe and analysed using correlation analysis in the time domain 
and in the frequency domain. The analysis in the frequency domain was successful in 
retrieving the secret small part of the key in the three experiments presented while 
correlation analysis in the time domain was successful only for the JCOP30. Finally, the 
conclusions of this thesis with a summary of the contributions and future work are 





Introduction to Smart Cards 
Smart cards are one type of embedded system that has become quite common in our 
daily lives. Given the multiple varieties of smart cards, this chapter focuses on the 
processor cards and describes their characteristics in contact cards, contactless cards 
and dual interface cards. Then, it outlines the physical characteristics, internal 
organization, and communication protocols for the type A and type B cards (contactless 
and dual interface cards, respectively) followed by a short description of the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm.  
2.1 Classification of the Smart Cards 
Smart cards have progressed from basic memory cards in the early 1970s to 
microprocessor cards equipped with cryptographic processors, security sensors and 
USB 2.0 low speed contact interfaces (NXP, 2008). They have diversified from 
phone cards to credit/debit cards, transport cards, identification cards, electronic 
passports, etc. Even though the applications of smart cards are diverse, there are 
similar structures and patterns in the cards. It is possible to classify all types of cards 
according to Figure 2.1 (Rankl, 2007).  
 
Figure 2.1: General classification of cards (Rankl, 2007). 
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The first division is between the cards without a chip and the cards with a chip, also 
known as smart cards. Among the smart cards there are memory cards, only able to store 
data, and microprocessor (processor) cards, able to store and process information. The 
microprocessor cards are divided into contact, contactless and dual interface cards. Dual 
interface cards are both contact and contactless cards. This research only covers aspects 
related to the microprocessor cards and focuses on the aspects of the dual interface card 
working in contactless mode. 
2.1.1 Hardware 
Each chip manufacturer typically includes specific features in their cards; however, the 
most basic characteristics are in the ISO/IEC 7816 standard. This standard specifies 
physical characteristics, dimensions and locations of the contacts, the electrical interface 
and transmission protocols, among other characteristics. This section refers to a few parts 
of the standard. Table 2.1 shows the different sections that this standard contains. 





ISO/IEC 7816-1 1998 Physical characteristics 
ISO/IEC 7816-2 2007 
Cards with contacts -- Dimensions and location of the 
contacts 
ISO/IEC 7816-3 2006 
Cards with contacts Electrical interface and transmission 
protocols 
ISO/IEC 7816-4 2005 Organization, security and commands for interchange 
ISO/IEC 7816-5 2004 Registration of application providers 
ISO/IEC 7816-6 2004 Interindustry data elements for interchange 
ISO/IEC 7816-7 1999 
Interindustry commands for Structured Card Query 
Language (SCQL) 
ISO/IEC 7816-8 2004 Commands for security operations 
ISO/IEC 7816-9 2004 Commands for card management 
ISO/IEC 7816-10 1999 
Electronic signals and answer to reset for synchronous 
cards 
ISO/IEC 7816-11 2004 Personal verification through biometric methods 
ISO/IEC 7816-12 2005 
Cards with contacts USB electrical interface and 
operating procedures 
ISO/IEC 7816-13 2007 
Commands for application management in a multi-
application environment 
ISO/IEC 7816-15 2004 Cryptographic information application 
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The physical characteristics of the smart cards are regulated by the ISO 7816-1 and 
ISO 7816-2 standards. Figure 2.2 illustrates the dimensions of the smart card associated 
with these standards. 
 
Figure 2.2: Smart card dimensions according to ISO/IEC 7816-1 and  
ISO/IEC 7816-2 (Jun, 2003). 
The internal characteristics of a smart card include at least a Central Processing Unit 
(CPU), an input/output interface, a data bus and memory. Some smart cards contain a 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) coprocessor for RSA and ECC public key standards 
(NXP, 2008). In 1993 Philips Semiconductors reported the use of the P83C852 controller 
to generate or verify Digital Signatures using the public key algorithm RSA and also an 
example for the implementation of cipher functions related to DES (Imjela, 1996); 
currently, some card models include AES and Triple DES coprocessors (NXP, 2008). 
Even today, smart card microcontrollers are most commonly based on the 8-bit CPU. 
The 8051 microcontroller is one of the most popular CPUs and has been on the market 
for more than two decades (Pearson and Albus, 2009). Until 2005, this microcontroller 
could be commonly found in car engine control units (Parab et al. 2007). The JCOP30 
and JCOP41 Java Cards are two common smart cards which are used in this research. 
According to the database smartcard_list (Rousseau, 2012) these cards correspond to the 
Mifare ProX (Philips, 2003) and NXP JCOP41 (Philips, 2006) respectively. The Mifare 
ProX and Smart MX Java Cards are based on the extended 8051 architecture 
 
10 
(NXP, 2009c). There are some cards that use 16-bit microcontrollers and a few are based 
on 32-bit processor families such as ARM 7 or MIPS (Rankl, 2007).  
2.1.2 Software 
In the last few years, software within the smart cards has evolved from dedicated 
special purpose programs for a single application to true operating systems. One factor 
that has put pressure in this direction is the cost of custom tailored programs embedded 
in the ROM of the smart cards. The Java Card overcomes these obstacles allowing third 
party programmers to develop applications that can be installed and run in the card 
after the card leaves the production line. Java Cards offer an open platform that defines 
the standard application, programming interfaces and run time environment. The 
platform encapsulates the underlying complexity and details of the smart card system 
(ISO/IEC, 2011). 
The smart card operating system supports a collection of instructions on which user 
applications can be built. For example, the ISO 7816-4 standard specifies a wide range 
of instructions in the form of application protocol data units (APDUs). Smart card 
operating systems may support some or all of these APDUs as well as the 
manufacturer’s additions. Most smart cards support a modest file system based on 
ISO/IEC 7816-4 (Chen, 2000). This standard defines details such as the commands and 
responses transmitted by the card reader and vice versa; the content of the bytes sent 
during the answer to reset; the structure of files and data and the access methods to files 
and data in the card (ISO/IEC, 2011). 
2.2 Types of Smart Cards 
As mentioned before, there are three types of microprocessor smart cards: contact, 
contactless and dual interface. Each type of card has its own advantages. In the case of 
the contact cards, they have the advantage of computing with a faster processor and 
uninterrupted power supply. In the case of the contactless cards, they use radio frequency 
to power the card and also to communicate. These features are desirable in applications 
such as public transport where the absence of contact with the card reader prevent stress 
on both the card and reader and avoid failures due to bad contacts. In the case of the dual 
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interface cards, they are able to work as contact and contactless cards with the contact 
interface mode preferred in the higher value transactions (Hendry, 2007). 
2.2.1 Contact Cards 
Contact smart cards come with contact eight pins. Six pins are used as follows: Power 
supply voltage (VCC), ground (GND), programming Voltage (VPP), input/output (I/O), 
reset (RST) and clock (CLK). The other two pins are reserved for future use. In the case 
of VCC, the typical voltage is 5 V. Figure 2.3 shows the specific position of each one of 
the pins. 
 
Figure 2.3: Smart Contacts of the Smart Card Module according  
ISO/IEC 7816-2 (Jun, 2003). 
In the case of the contact cards, they typically contain a microprocessor (CPU), a 
coprocessor also called numeric process unit (NPU), ROM, EEPROM, and RAM. 




Figure 2.4: Typical architecture of contact microprocessor card (Rankl and Effing, 2000). 
The amount of ROM, EEPROM and RAM depends on the microcircuit design; 
however, as a rule of thumb, each cell of RAM requires 4 times more space than a cell of 
EEPROM and this needs 4 times more space than a cell of ROM (Rankl and Effing, 
2000). In the case of the ROM, it is used to store most of the operating system of the 
card. The data and programs in this type of memory are permanent and they can only be 
written during the manufacturing process. The EEPROM is used to store programs and 
information that should remain in the card after the power is off. The Java Cards store in 
this type of memory their Java applets. RAM is another type of memory, which stores 
temporal information and calculations of the CPU. The content of the RAM is lost once 
the card is powered off (Rankl and Effing, 2000). 
2.2.2 Contactless Cards 
Contactless cards do not have contacts and depend on the reader to power them. They 
work under the principle of inductive coupling and contain an antenna that is embedded 
in the card. This antenna is used to receive energy and also data from the terminal 
(reader). In accordance with the ISO 14443 standard, the reader or proximity coupling 
device (PCD) produces an energizing RF field of 13.56 MHz ± 7 kHz. The signal that 
comes from the antenna passes to the RF interface where the information is demodulated 
before it passes to the card’s CPU. In the case of the response from the card to the reader, 
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the information coming from the card’s CPU is modulated and then sent to the reader 
through the antenna. Figure 2.5 shows the typical structure of this type of card. It is 
possible to observe that the card contains basically the same modules as the contact card 
but instead of the socket, it contains the RF interface. 
 
Figure 2.5: Typical architecture of a contactless card (Rankl and Effing, 2000). It includes 
a microcontroller and a RF interface in the same chip. 
2.2.3 Dual Interface 
Dual interface cards are both contact and contactless. Hence, their architecture is 
basically the same as a contactless card. On one side of the card they have the same 
contacts as a regular contact card and additionally embedded in the card but on the other 
side of the socket a connection to its antenna. Figure 2.6 presents a photo from a dual 
interface where the back of the card was scratched. The image shows the position of the 
chip and its antenna connections. Also visible are the contact points that come from the 
front of the card and how they are connected to the circuit. The position of the chip is 




Figure 2.6: Microprocessor and antenna in a JCOP30. 
As mentioned previously, the chip of the smart card contains the CPU, memory, RF 
module and all the other circuits necessary to work except the antenna that is embedded 
around the card. Memory resources are very important, not only in dual interface cards, 
but also in contact and in contactless cards. They restrict the size and number of applets 
that can be installed in the card. Similar to the contact and contactless cards, the dual 
interface cards come with ROM, EEPROM and RAM. Table 2.2 presents a comparative 
table showing the resources of 4 different types of dual-interface Java Cards, JCOP30, 
JCOP31-36, JCOP31-72 and JCOP41 (IBM, 2000) (IBM, 2002). 
Table 2.2: Memory resources in different smart card models. 




EEPROM: 14 kbytes 36 kbytes 72 kbytes 72 kbytes 
RAM: 487 bytes 2,304 bytes 4,608 bytes 4,608 bytes 




2.3 Communication Protocols on Contactless Smart Cards 
The communication protocols on contactless smart cards define how data is transmitted 
from/to a card reader to/from the card. The knowledge of these protocols allows one to 
determine the time when the card finishes receiving the data and when it starts 
transmitting the computed response. This processing time in the microprocessor is 
fundamental to setup a side channel attack.  
The ISO 14443-2 standard (ISO/IEC, 2011) establishes the communication and 
transmission protocols between card readers and contactless smart cards. It may follow 
two types of communication, type A or type B. All card readers must support both types 
of protocols, even though the cards only need to use one of them at a time. 
2.3.1 Type A Protocol 
The protocol known as type A, uses amplitude shift keying (ASK) modulation 100% 
with modified Miller coding for communication from the card to the reader. As its 
name indicates the amplitude of the carrier oscillation is switched between 100% and 
0%. In the modified Miller coding, a “1” is represented by a “pause” (in the half bit 
period). For a logic “0”, no modulation shall occur for the full bit duration except if 
there are two or more contiguous “0”s. In that case, a “pause” shall occur from the 
second “0” at the beginning of the bit period (Finkenzeller, 2003). The blanking 
intervals or pauses go from 2 µs to 3.5 µs. This coding guarantees a continuous power 
supply from the reader to the contactless card. Figure 2.7 shows how the ones and zeros 




Figure 2.7: Modulation ASK 100% with Modified Miller coding (ISO/IEC, 1999a). 
In the type A protocol, the response from the card to the reader uses load modulation 
with a subcarrier. The subcarrier frequency is 13.56 MHz/16 ≈ 847 kHz. For the 
subcarrier modulation every bit period starts with a defined phase relation to the 
subcarrier. The bit period starts with the loaded state of the subcarrier. Figure 2.8 shows 
the way this modulation is performed. For a logical “1”, the carrier is modulated with the 
subcarrier for the first half of the period. For a logical “0”, the carrier is modulated with 
the subcarrier for the second half of the period. The type A protocol is used in the Java 
Cards analyzed in this research. 
 
Figure 2.8: Load modulation with subcarrier using Manchester coding (ISO/IEC, 1999a). 
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2.3.2 Type B Protocol 
The type B protocol is specified in the ISO 14443-2 standard. It uses ASK 10% 
modulation for communication from the card to the reader. As its name suggests the 
modulation index should be 10% with a minimum of 8% and a maximum of 14% 
accepted (ISO/IEC, 1999a). The coding used in this protocol is Non-Return-to-Zero-
Level (NRZ-L). For logic “1”, no modulation is applied and for “0” the carrier uses the 
low field amplitude. Figure 2.9 presents an example of this coding. 
 
Figure 2.9: Modulation ASK 10% amplitude using NRZ-L coding (ISO/IEC, 1999a).  
The response from the card to the reader for the type B protocol uses load modulation 
with a subcarrier of 847 kHz. The subcarrier is modulated by 180˚ phase shift keying 
(BPSK) of the subcarrier using the NRZ coded data stream (Finkenzeller, 2003). To start 
a transmission from the card to the reader, the card generates a subcarrier phase 
reference ø0. This initial phase state ø0 of the subcarrier is defined as logical 1 so the first 
phase transition represents a change from logical “1” to logical “0”. Next, in accordance 
with the phase reference, the logical “1” is ø0 and the logical “0” is ø0 + 180˚. Figure 2.10 




Figure 2.10: Load Modulation with subcarrier, using  
BPSK NRZL coding (ISO/IEC, 1999a). 
 
2.4 Security in Smart Cards 
As mentioned before to increase performance, some cards contain special coprocessors to 
encrypt or decrypt information using a symmetric key scheme. Software implementations 
are cheaper than hardware implementations but usually are slower. For example, in this 
research an applet was implemented that encrypts a 128-bit message using the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES). In a JCOP30 card, the AES algorithm took approximately 3 
seconds to encrypt the information. Hardware implementations are faster than software 
but they are rigid and cannot be changed once they leave the production line. Java Cards 
have such flexibility that it is possible to change and update the programs at any time.  
There are many encryption/decryption algorithms used in smart cards; some of them 
are public and well known like the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple-DES, or 
AES. Others are “secret” as in the case of CRYPTO1 (Koning et al. 2008). AES will be 





AES is the acronym for the Advanced Encryption Standard. This standard was 
announced on November 26, 2001 by the National Bureau of Standards now known as 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). It came into effect on May 
26, 2002 and came to replace DES for unclassified information requiring cryptographic 
protection (NIST, 2001). 
In some smart cards, this standard is implemented in hardware such as JCOP41 cards, 
but AES can also be implemented in software. AES is a symmetric block cipher that uses 
sequences of 128 bits and may use keys with lengths of 128 bits, 192 bits or 256 bits. 
Depending on the key length, it is sometimes called AES-128, AES-192 or AES-256. 
At the start of AES, the input is copied to a “State” array. Next, depending on the 
key length, a routine named Key Expansion is used to calculate the array “w”. It is 
followed by 9, 11 or 13 rounds of transformations depending on the key length plus a 
final round that is slightly different (MixColums transformation). In each round, the 
algorithm does a SubBytes (S-box) transformation, a ShiftRows transformation, a 
MixColums transformation, and an AddRoundKey. The pseudocode for the AES 
cipher is shown in Figure 2.11. 
 
 
Cipher(byte in[4*Nb], byte out[4*Nb], word w[Nb*(Nr+1)]) 
Begin 
byte state[4,Nb] 
state = in 
 
AddRoundKey(state, w[0, Nb-1])  
 









AddRoundKey(state, w[Nr*Nb, (Nr+1)*Nb-1]) 
out = state 
end 
Figure 2.11: Pseudocode for the AES cipher (NIST, 2001). 
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The SubBytes transformation consists of a non-linear substitution, where each byte of 
the State is replaced by a corresponding value using the S-box table (Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3: S-box: substitution values for the byte xy in hexadecimal format (NIST, 2001). 
 Y 
x 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 
0 63 7c 77 7b f2 6b 6f c5 30 01 67 2b fe d7 ab 76 
1 ca 82 c9 7d fa 59 47 f0 ad d4 a2 af 9c a4 72 c0 
2 b7 fd 93 26 36 3f f7 cc 34 a5 e5 f1 71 d8 31 15 
3 04 c7 23 c3 18 96 05 9a 07 12 80 e2 eb 27 b2 75 
4 09 83 2c 1a 1b 6e 5a a0 52 3b d6 b3 29 e3 2f 84 
5 53 d1 00 ed 20 fc b1 5b 6a cb be 39 4a 4c 58 cf 
6 d0 ef aa fb 43 4d 33 85 45 f9 02 7f 50 3c 9f a8 
7 51 a3 40 8f 92 9d 38 f5 bc b6 da 21 10 ff f3 d2 
8 cd 0c 13 ec 5f 97 44 17 c4 a7 7e 3d 64 5d 19 73 
9 60 81 4f dc 22 2a 90 88 46 ee b8 14 de 5e 0b db 
a e0 32 3a 0a 49 06 24 5c c2 d3 ac 62 91 95 e4 79 
b e7 c8 37 6d 8d d5 4e a9 6c 56 f4 ea 65 7a ae 08 
c ba 78 25 2e 1c a6 b4 c6 e8 dd 74 1f 4b bd 8b 8a 
d 70 3e b5 66 48 03 f6 0e 61 35 57 b9 86 c1 1d 9e 
e e1 f8 98 11 69 d9 8e 94 9b 1e 87 e9 ce 55 28 df 
f 8c a1 89 0d bf e6 42 68 41 99 2d 0f b0 54 bb 16 
 
The ShiftRows transformation consists of cyclically shifting the last three rows of the 
State. Figure 2.12 illustrates how this transformation works. 
 
Figure 2.12: ShiftRows() cyclically shifts the last three rows in the State (NIST, 2001). 
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The MixColums transformation operates on the State array and treats each column as a 
four term polynomial over GF(2
8
) which is multiplied modulo x
4
+1 with a fixed 
polynomial a(x) given by (2-1)  
                              (2-1) 
The AddRoundKey transformation consists of a bitwise XOR operation between the 
State array and a word from the key scheduled for that round. Figure 2.13 shows the 
pseudocode to calculate the key expansion. 
 
SubWord() is a function that takes a four-bit word and applies the S-box table. 
RotWord() is a function that also takes a four-bit word and performs cyclic permutations 
to the values of the word and Rcon(i) is the round constant word array; it contains the 
values given by: [02
i-1
, {00}, {00}, {00}]. 
Implementations of this algorithm are typically attacked on the S-box. The preferred 
targets are the first or last AES S-box. In the case of the first S-box in round one, the 
intermediate result is a function of the first byte of plaintext and the first byte of the 
KeyExpansion(byte key[4*Nk], word w[Nb*(Nr+1)], Nk) 
begin 
word temp 
i = 0 
while (i < Nk) 
w[i] = word(key[4*i], key[4*i+1], key[4*i+2], key[4*i+3]) 
i = i+1 
end while 
i = Nk 
while (i < Nb * (Nr+1)] 
temp = w[i-1] 
if (i mod Nk = 0) 
temp = SubWord(RotWord(temp)) xor Rcon[i/Nk] 
else if (Nk > 6 and i mod Nk = 4) 
temp = SubWord(temp) 
end if 
w[i] = w[i-Nk] xor temp 
i = i + 1 
end while 
end 
Figure 2.13: Pseudo code for Key expansion (NIST 2001).  
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secret key while in the last round it is function of the ciphertext and the last byte of the 
secret key (Mangard et al. 2007). The next chapter introduces different types of 
cryptographic attacks. 
2.5 Summary 
A brief overview of the hardware and software characteristics of microprocessor-based 
smart cards in this chapter has been presented. The communication protocols type A and 
type B were described. The type A protocol is used by the Java Cards studied in this 
research. This protocol is employed by the card reader to communicate with the smart 
card and is used in Chapter 6 for triggering the oscilloscope. The AES algorithm was also 
briefly outlined at the end of the chapter and it is used by the different systems tested in 
this research. The next chapter presents an overview of side channel analysis and focuses 





Side Channel Analysis 
Side channel analysis is the process of obtaining additional information about the internal 
activity of a physical device beyond that allowed by its specifications. Timing attacks are 
an example of side channel attacks. This kind of attack was introduced by Paul Kocher to 
attack implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSA and other cryptographic 
algorithms. It consisted of measuring the time required to perform private key operations 
to determine, for example, in the Diffie-Hellman scheme, the Diffie-Hellman exponents 
(Kocher, 1996). Power analysis and EM analysis are types of side channel attacks used to 
look for weaknesses in the algorithm implementation. The main idea is to measure the 
power consumption or EM emanations of a device when it is encrypting/decrypting a 
plaintext/ciphertext using a secret key, and then analyse those measurements to try to 
recover the secret key.  
This chapter describes the characteristics of power analysis and EM analysis. It focuses 
on one specific type of attack called correlation analysis and explains how this attack is 
implemented in the time and in the frequency domain. It also presents two new ways to 
evaluate the results of a side channel attack. At the end of this chapter, some preliminary 
results show the effectiveness of the proposed techniques (Mateos and Gebotys, 2010). 
These results include the use of EM and power traces in the time and frequency domains. 
The EM traces were acquired with a commercial inductive probe placed over the 8-bit 
AT89C51ED2 microcontroller which is based on the Intel family 8051. This 
microcontroller was selected considering its relative similarity to the extended 8051 
architecture (NXP, 2009c) inside the JCOP30 and JCOP41 Java Cards, which are later 
studied in this research. The effects of the clock frequency and number of traces used in 
the correlation analysis in the frequency domain are explored. The analyses in the time 
and frequency domain are compared using the proposed metrics, the execution time, and 
the capacity to deal with random misalignments. The power traces used to complement 
the study come from the public database of the DPA book WS3 (Mangard et al. 2010b). 
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This workspace includes two sets of 1,000, traces one with dummy operations and one 
without them, and correlation analysis in the time and frequency domain is used to 
analyse them. 
3.1 Power Analysis 
Simple power analysis (SPA) is an example of side channel analysis where an attacker 
monitors the power consumption of the processor when it executes a cryptographic 
operation and directly interprets the power measurements (Kocher et al. 1999). Using one 
or more power traces, the attacker may identify characteristics such as timing, device 
attributes and the implemented algorithm structure (Kocher et al. 2011). With simple 
power analysis, the attacker can look for branching operations or distinguish between 
operations with different power consumptions (Kocher et al. 2004) (Gebotys, 2010). 
Simple power analysis has been used to attack cryptographic implementations in smart 
cards. For example, research in (Novak, 2002) presents an attack on a smart card 
implementation of the RSA decryption algorithm. There are some cases where the power 
consumption of a simple instruction has a direct correlation with the Hamming weight of 
the data processed. This fact was shown in (Mayer-Sommer, 2000) using a PIC16C84 
microprocessor and also in (Messerges et al. 2002) using an HC05 microprocessor based 
smart card.  
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is a more powerful kind of side channel analysis 
which was introduced by Kocher, Jaffe and Jun (Kocher et al. 1999). This technique 
looks for weaknesses in the algorithm implementations and presents some advantages 
over SPA, because DPA does not require detailed knowledge of the device under study. 
This method is based on statistical analysis and generally requires a large number of 
samples and traces. The attack focuses on guessing an intermediate result inside the 
algorithm that is a function of the plaintext/ciphertext and the secret key. First, the power 
consumption from the device under scrutiny is recorded when the device is 
encrypting/decrypting data. The device encrypts/decrypts data m times and the attacker 
records m traces. Let the power trace obtained at the d-th iteration be Td and Td(j) is the 
j-th sample within this trace. Then, the traces are divided into two groups according to the 
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value of the g-th bit (bg) of intermediate data calculated from a key guess. One group 
called Tone(t) contains the done traces where the bit bg is expected to be 1, Tone(t)={Td(t)|   
d where bg=“1”}. The other called Tzero(t) contains dzero traces where the bit bg is expected 
to be “0”, Tzero(t)={Td(t)|   d where bg=“0”}. Next the mean of each group of traces is 
calculated                                       and subtracted from each other. The difference of means 
(DOM) attempts to eliminate the algorithm impacts on the power traces and keeps the 
information related to bit g (Gebotys, 2006). The differential analysis based on one guess 
of the key is calculated using (3-1) 
                                           (3-1) 
The maximum magnitude over all key guesses is used to determine the correct key. 
DPA was used to examine the security of smart cards against DES implementations as 
studied in (Kocher et al. 1999), (Messerges, 2000), (Clavier et al. 2000), and 
(Messerges et al. 2002). In a similar way, DPA was applied to attack an elliptic curve 
(EC) cryptosystem as shown in (Coron, 1999) where they also showed the 
vulnerabilities of unprotected implementations of EC Diffie-Hellman key exchange and 
EC El-Gamal encryption. In (Messerges et al. 1999) DPA was used against smartcard 
implementations of modular exponentiation while in (Lu et al. 2009b) it is used to 
analyse an ASIC implementation of AES. A variation of DPA call Differential 
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (DEMA) was suggested by (Quisquater and Samyde, 2001) 
to analyse a contact smart card. With DEMA instead of using power traces one uses 
electromagnetic traces. DEMA was used to analyse the security of other smart cards in 
(Gandolfi et al. 2001) and (Agrawal et al. 2002). 
In (Chari et al. 2002), template attacks were introduced. This attack involves two 
phases; first, the attacker characterizes the device by building a template model, 
executing a determined sequence of instructions using fixed data and capturing the 
corresponding power or EM traces. With these traces, the attacker tries to build a precise 
multivariate normal distribution model (Mangard et al. 2007). The second phase consists 
of matching the template models with the traces acquired from the device under attack 
(Medwed and Oswald, 2008).  
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Mutual Information Analysis (MIA) is a generic side channel attack based on 
information theory distinguishers. It was proposed by (Gierlichs et al. 2008) and 
measures the total dependency between two random variables X and Y. The total 
information shared between the two variables can be expressed in terms of entropy 
using Shannon’s formula I(X;Y) = H(X)–H(X|Y), where H(X) is the entropy of the 
random variable X and H(X|Y) is the conditional entropy of the random variable X 
given the variable Y (Menezes et al. 1997) (Veyrat-Charvillon and Standaert, 2009). 
Although, MIA was expected to exploit all information contained within trace 
measurements and capture the true dependency between the real device leakage and the 
modeled leakage, there is little evidence that these expectations are met in practice 
(Whitnall and Oswald, 2011). Different works like (Prouff and Rivain, 2010) have 
compared Correlation Power Analysis to MIA and the results indicate that MIA is less 
efficient than CPA when the deterministic part of the leakage is a linear function of the 
model used by the attacker. In (Moradi et al. 2009) it was found that MIA had a bigger 
computational overhead than CPA and MIA worked worse in the presence of noise. 
Research in (Veyrat-Charvillon and Standaert, 2009) indicated that when a reasonable 
leakage model is known, techniques such as Correlation Power Analysis are more 
efficient than MIA. 
There are other types of side channel analysis and a good review can be found in the 
DPA book (Mangard et al. 2007). Research in (Doget et al. 2011) compared different side 
channel attacks. The attacks analysed included Differential Power Analysis (Kocher et al. 
1999), Enhanced DPA (Bevan and Knudsen, 2003), Correlation Power Analysis (Brier et 
al. 2004), and Partitioning Power Analysis (PPA) (Thanh-Ha Le et al. 2006). The result 
of this study concluded that if the attacker has a good linear approximation of the leakage 
function, Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) is an optimal way to perform an attack. 
3.2 EM Analysis 
Electromagnetic (EM) analysis is similar to power analysis; however, the EM emanations 
from an electronic device are measured instead of power signals. The EM emanations are 
recorded when the device is encrypting or decrypting a plaintext/ciphertext using a secret 
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key. Similar to DPA, the attacker later tries to recover the key through analysing the 
recorded measurements. EM analysis is based on some principles of EM theory that are 
briefly described below. 
In the first place, Biot-Savart’s law states that when an electrical current ic moves 
through a straight conductor, at all points on a circle of radius r around that conductor, 
the magnitude of the magnetic field     generated is given by Equation (3-2), where µ0 is 
the permeability of free space (µ0=4π×10
-7 
Wb/A˙m) (Young and Freedman, 1996). 
  
    
   
 (3-2) 
In a more generic way, Maxwell’s third equation (3-3) refers to a similar phenomenon. 
It states that the magnetic field     depends on the conduction current ic and the 
displacement current   dΦE/dt, where    is the permittivity of free space (  ≈ 8.85 x 10
-12 
F/m) and dΦE/dt, is the time rate of change of electric flux (Young and Freedman, 1996).  
                    
   
  
  (3-3) 
In this scenario, one might assume that when an electronic device is processing 
information, some currents are flowing inside the internal circuits and consequently 
producing magnetic fields.  
Another principle exploited by EM analysis is Faraday’s law (3-4), which states that 
the induced electromotive force ε in a closed loop equals the negative of the time rate of 
change of magnetic flux dΦB through the loop. The term dΦB equals the magnetic field     
for an infinitesimal area          (Young and Freedman, 1996). 
   
   
  
 (3-4) 
In a similar way, Maxwell’s fourth equation (3-5) states that a changing magnetic flux 
dΦB induces an electric field       (Young and Freedman, 1996). 
            





For this reason, every time a coil is placed close to a magnetic field, it induces an 
electromotive force on the coil. Specifically placing a coil or an EM probe close to an 
electronic circuit that is processing data, might induce some voltages on the terminals of 
the probe that are correlated with the data processed by the circuit and consequently 
provide information about the data itself.  
3.3 Correlation Analysis 
The population correlation coefficient ρ is defined as a measure of linear association or 
clustering around a line (Freedman et al. 1998). Considering two sets of data X and Y 
with population standard deviations σX, σY and population covariance cov(X,Y), the 
magnitude of the population correlation coefficient ρ could be calculated using (3-6). 
When the ρ is close to 1 or -1, there exists a strong correlation between the sets, when ρ is 
close to zero there is a weak correlation.  
       
        
        
 (3-6) 
In the case of side channel analysis, the correlation coefficient ρ indicates the similarity 
between the hypothetical power consumption model and the one measured (power 
consumption or EM power consumption). In general, the value of the population 
correlation ρ is unknown and needs to be estimated by using the sample covariance and 
sample standard deviation (Mangard et al. 2007). This estimate of the correlation factor ρ 
can be denoted by    (Brier et al. 2004) or similar to this research, r is used. In the next 
sections, three variations of correlation analysis, in the time domain, in the frequency 
domain, and one called fast correlation in the frequency domain are described. All 
descriptions are matrix based which allow a straightforward implementation. 
3.3.1 Correlation Analysis in the Time Domain 
Correlation of coefficients is a method used to measure the correlation between the 
power traces obtained when an electronic device is processing a given data and the 
hypothetical power consumption model. The hypothetical power consumption model 
can be the Hamming-weight HW or the Hamming distance of the data processed. It was 
first proposed by (Brier et al. 2004) and since then, it has been widely studied on a 
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variety of devices such as 8-bit microcontrollers running AES implementations 
(Mangard, 2004), (Doget et al. 2011), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) 
(Ors et al. 2004), (Lu et al. 2009a), microcontrollers with AES coprocessors 
(Kizhvatov, 2009), FPGAs using DES implementations (Standaert et al. 2004) or 
CAST-128 implementations (Boey et al. 2010), (Kean et al. 2010). Also EM correlation 
analysis in the time domain has been studied with DES implementations in smart cards 
(Kasper et al. 2011), (Kasper et al. 2009), (Oswald and Paar 2011), and ASICs (Thanh-
Ha Le et al. 2006), (Le et al. 2008).  
Correlation analysis works as follows: first, it is necessary to define an attack point in 
the algorithm implementation. This point must be a function of non-constant data and a 
small part of the key. Using D different plaintexts/ciphertext and considering all possible 
values of a small portion of the key K, the hypothetical power consumption model matrix 
HP is prepared. The Hamming distance can be used to build the power consumption 
model. The Hamming distance corresponds to the number of bits that differ from an 
initial value v0 and its final value v1 HD(v0,v1). The Hamming weight is used some times 
to model the power consumption. It corresponds to a particular case of Hamming distance 
where the initial value v0=0. Hamming weight models are typically more suitable for 
circuits that contain pre-charged buses.  
The Pearson correlation of coefficients requires the measurement or acquisition of D 
power consumption or EM traces. Let Td(j), represent the j-th sample in the d-th trace, 
where j=1,...N for N samples per trace and d=1,...D. Using Equation (3-7), the Pearson 
correlation for the matrix of correlation R is calculated (Brier et al. 2004). Additional 
terminology includes: Ki, i=1,…,k, for the i-th hypothetical value of the small part of the 
key K;           corresponds to the mean of all D traces, Td(j), at the j-th sample; HPi is the 
hypothetical power or Hamming weight of the intermediate data for the i-th hypothetical 
key guess;          corresponds to the average hypothetical power for the hypothetical i-th 
key guess (or mean of all D Hamming weights for the i-th key guess). 
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 (3-7) 
The possible correct small part of the key, Ki , used for the encryption/decryption of the 
data corresponds to row i that contains the element with the maximum magnitude 
(positive or negative). 
3.3.2 Correlation in the Frequency Domain 
Correlation analysis in the frequency domain measures the level of association between 
the hypothetical power consumption model and the power spectrum measured. It requires 
the power spectrum Fd from the D power or EM traces using the Fast Fourier Transform 
(FFT) as indicated in Equation (3-8). Here Fd(j) represents the amplitude of the frequency 
j for trace d, where j=1,...,NFFT, NFFT is the number of frequency components returned 
by the FFT transform and is related to the sampling rate, and d=1,..D, is the d-th trace 
used in the analysis. Since the FFT is a symmetrical transformation, it is possible to 
analyze only one-half of the frequencies. Thus, the size of Fd(j’) becomes D rows and 
NFFT/2 columns, with j’=1,…,NFFT/2.  
    
            
  (3-8) 
The hypothetical power consumption model is generated following the same steps as in 
the analysis for the time domain. The Pearson correlation r between the hypothetical 
power consumption model and the power spectrum is calculated using Equation (3-9). 
Equations (3-7) and (3-9) have the same structure, with the differences that (3-7) uses the 
power or EM traces Td(j) in the time domain and it’s of size [D×N]; while Equation (3-9) 
utilize the power spectrum Fd(j’) and it is of size [D×NFFT/2]. 
      
       
          
 
         
                
 
   
        
        
          
 
                       
  
   
 (3-9) 
Each row in the correlation matrix R is associated with a possible key guess (i) and the 
columns are related to the frequencies from the power spectrum used (j’). As in the time 
domain analysis, the possible correct key is determined by finding the row i that contains 
the element with the maximum absolute values from the matrix.  
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Correlation analysis in the frequency domain has been used to analyse AES simulation 
power traces from a 0.25 µm CMOS design (Schimmel et al. 2010), EM traces from 8-bit 
microcontrollers (Peng et al. 2009), and EM traces from FPGAs (Hodgers et al. 2011). In 
a similar way, has been used to analyse EM traces from hardware implementations of 
DES in smart cards using customised analog demodulation (based on low-pass active 
filters) that removed the carrier and high frequency components (Kasper et al. 2011), 
(Oswald and Paar, 2011).  
3.3.3 Proposed Fast Correlation in the Frequency Domain 
Fast correlation in the frequency domain is based on correlation analysis in the frequency 
domain, but the main difference is the smaller number of frequencies, P, considered in 
the analysis. It requires pre-characterizing the attacked device to determine the range of 
frequencies that are more likely to return higher correlations or the range of frequencies 
more likely to relate to the data under attack. An empirical analysis is required to 
determine the range or set of frequencies with the higher magnitudes, when most of the 
power or EM measurements from the device are associated with the 
encryption/decryption process.  
This range of frequencies (or equivalently set of columns) is represented by j'', where 
j''=m+1, m+2, ... , m+P and {m+1, m+2, ... , m+P}⊂{1, 2, ... , NFFT/2}. Let Fd(j'') 
represent the amplitude of the j''-th frequency in the d-th trace. The new matrix F and the 
hypothetical power consumption model are used to calculate the matrix of correlation 
using the Pearson correlation defined by Equation (3-10).  
       
                 
 
             
 
           
 
   
                          
 
                       
  
   
 
(3-10) 
The matrix of correlation R contains P columns and i rows. Each column is associated 
with one of the frequencies selected and each row is related to one of the possible key 
guesses. The value from the matrix with maximum magnitude corresponds to the possible 
correct key. If the guessed key is equal to the correct key, the range of frequencies is kept 
as a possible set. When the guessed key is different from the correct key, then the range 
of frequencies is modified to include other frequencies and the analysis repeated. In case 
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the correct key is unknown, Section 3.4 presents a technique to evaluate the significance 
of the key guessed. 
The number of operations required to perform the FFT depends on the size of N. When 
N is a power of 2, the data transformation requires N log2 N operations, otherwise it 
would require N
2
 operations (Storey, 2002). The number of operations required for 
computing the different correlation analysis would vary depending on the size of N and 
the range of frequencies used in the analysis. In general, correlation analysis in the time 
domain requires one to correlate a matrix HP of size [D×i] with another matrix T of size 
[D×N]. It is necessary to calculate the correlation of i×N vectors of length D. In the case 
of correlation analysis in the frequency domain, the size of the matrix F is set to 
[D×NFFT/2], where NFFT is recommended to be equal to the next power of 2 that is 
greater than or equal to N, and NFFT/2 is always smaller or equal to N. Hence, 
correlation analysis in the frequency domain processes fewer than or an equal number of 
correlation vectors to the time domain analysis when all the samples are processed. Fast 
correlation in the frequency domain correlates fewer vectors than correlation analysis in 
the frequency domain analysis because only a subset of NFFT’ frequencies is analyzed. 
One aspect to consider to improve the performance of the fast correlation in the 
frequency domain is to analyse a small number frequencies, NFFT’, thus the overhead 
time required to obtain the D FFT is smaller than the time required to calculate the 
correlation of i×(N-NFFT’) vectors of size D. 
3.4 Evaluating the Effectiveness of an Attack 
Few metrics have been proposed to measure the effectiveness of a side channel attack. 
Two security metrics that evaluate the success rate and guessing entropy are described in 
(Standaert et al. 2009). The success rate metric works as follows: First, all key guesses 
are sorted from most likely to least likely. To find the success rate of order 0, one needs 
to determine if the correct key is sorted among the first 0-th ranks. If this is true, the 
success rate equals 1 otherwise the success rate equals 0. A success rate of order 1 means 
that the correct key guess was sorted in the first rank. The guessing entropy metric 
presented in (Kopf and Basin, 2007) and (Standaert et al. 2009) is based on the guessing 
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and entropy work published by (Massey, 1994). In a simplified way, the guessing entropy 
works as follows: When all key guesses are sorted from the most likely to least likely, the 
guessing entropy corresponds to the rank position where a guessing key corresponds to 
the correct key. This value represents the expected number of key candidates that need to 
be tested after the side channel attack (Standaert et al. 2009).  
Sometimes the effectiveness of the attack is measured considering the number of 
traces required for discovering the correct key. Equation (3-11) proposed in (Mangard, 
2004) illustrates a way to calculate the number of traces S necessary to distinguish a 
significant peak in the correlation matrix in the time domain, where the quantile zα  
determines the distance between distributions with the maximum correlation ρmax and 
noncorrelated ρ=0. 
      
  
   
      





Another important parameter to consider when evaluating side channel attacks is the 
level of the noise. In (Mangard et al. 2007, Mangard, 2004), the authors use Equation 
(3-12) to measure the noise floor in correlation analysis based on the number of traces D. 




In this thesis, two new metrics are proposed that evaluate the effectiveness of an attack. 
One is called accuracy and the other estimation. Similar to the guessing entropy 
described in (Standaert et al. 2009), accuracy quantifies how close the key guess is from 
the correct key. It requires knowledge of the correct small part of the key but unlike the 
guessing entropy, it uses an exponential scale that minimises the contribution of the key 
guesses ranked in the last place and increases the weight on the guesses ranked in the first 
position. Equation (3-13) illustrates this calculation of the accuracy. The accuracy will 
change depending on the position the key guess is ranked. For example, first place 
corresponds to an accuracy of 1, second place to an accuracy of 0.5, third place an 
accuracy of 0.25, etc. The main rationale is to evaluate an attack that reaches the correct 
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key as two times better than one that returns the correct key in second place, and four 
times better than another one that returns the correct key in third place. 
         
 
       
 (3-13) 
The estimation metric is similar to the success rate of order 1 (Standaert et al. 2009) 
since it returns a 1 when the correct key is found and 0 if the correct key is not found. 
However, unlike the success rate, in the case of estimation the attacker does not need to 
know the correct key in advance. The estimation metric is based on statistical analyses of 
the correlation matrix and it provides a measure of confidence in the current key guess. 
Thus, it is useful for actual attacks as well as research analysis. Estimation is based on the 
magnitude of the correlation coefficients and how dispersed those values are. It measures 
the distance between the absolute maximum values from the correlation matrix R and the 
arithmetic mean of the maximum values for each key guess. The result is normalized 
dividing the distance between the maximum correlation value and the mean from all 
maximums by the standard deviations from all maximums. The way to obtain the 




Algorithm 3.1: Estimation 
Input: Correlation matrix R, coefficient δ 
Output: Estimation value {0 or 1} 
1:                             
2:                          ) 
3:                      
4:                    
5:                    
6:                        
7:                    ,  
8:        
9:                    
10:                    
The result from the estimation is a binary value that helps to decide if the analysis was 
meaningful or not. Accuracy and Estimation are additive metrics so that the results 
obtained for each small part of the key may be added to determine the effectiveness of the 
attack for the whole key. In the case of an attack on AES 128 where the small part of the 
key is 1 byte, an accuracy=16 means the whole key was successfully founded and an 
estimation=16 indicates that the returned key is meaningful for a 16 byte key algorithm.  
Unlike previous metrics, the use of an exponential scale in the accuracy metric helps 
the security researcher to more easily discriminate and evaluate good attacks, where the 
whole correct key was found or the marginal guesswork (Kopf and Basin, 2007) is little, 
from bad attacks, where marginal guesswork is big. In the case of the estimation metric, 
one can evaluate the effectiveness of an attack without knowing the correct key, based 
only on the statistical properties of the resulting correlation matrix.  
The next section compares the three correlation analysis methods described in 
Section 3.3 using different sets of traces such as EM traces using a commercial inductive 
probe and the power traces published in the DPAbook website (Mangard et al. 2010a). In 
some of the comparisons presented, the metrics of accuracy and estimation are used.  
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3.5 Experimental Setup and Initial Preliminary Results  
This section is divided in 2 parts, the first describing the analysis of the EM signals 
acquired from the microcontroller AT89C51ED (ATMEL, 2007), and the other section 
focusing on the results obtained from analyzing power traces presented in the DPA book 
home page WS3 (Mangard et al. 2010a).  
In the case of the EM traces obtained from the microcontroller, a number of scenarios 
which occur in side channel attacks are illustrated. In one case the clock frequency of the 
processor system changes. A case where the outcome of the analysis clearly returns the 
correct key is presented. In contrast another analysis returns the correct key as well, but it 
is not clear if the result is meaningful or not. The effects of adding more traces to the 
analysis is also explored. The time it takes for each methodology to process the data is 
also presented. The effects of misalignments in the acquired traces is also explored while 
the last scenario exemplifies the use of accuracy and estimation.  
3.5.1 Analysis of Microcontroller AT89C51ED2 
The experimental setup used for this section includes the AT89C51ED2 microcontroller 
within the Keil MCB251 evaluation board (Keil, 1997). The EM probe was placed over 
the microcontroller chip. The 1 cm inductive probe (Electro-Metrics Inc., 2004) was 
connected to a wideband amplifier (also provided by Electrometric) which was connected 
to the Tektronix TDS7254 digital oscilloscope (Tektronix, 2003). This scope was used 
for all EM traces captured in this thesis. The trigger for the oscilloscope is controlled 
using one bit of a parallel port from the microcontroller. The crystal that generates the 
clock signal for the microcontroller was removed and replaced by a Rohde & Schwarz 
SMA100A signal generator (R&S, 2011). The main objective of replacing the crystal by 
a signal generator was to gain control over the clock frequency from the board and set the 
microcontroller clock frequency to a desired speed with the maximum frequency allowed 
being 40 MHz. The side channel analyses were performed on 32 sets of 2,048 EM traces 
experimentally captured with a sampling resolution of 500 MS/s. The attack focuses on 
the first round of a software implementation of AES written in C running in the 
microcontroller processing one byte of the key.  
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After analysing different sets of EM traces using correlation analysis in the frequency 
domain, it was observed that the maximum correlations for the correct key of the 
microcontroller occurred in a specific range of frequencies between 30 MHz and 
50 MHz. This range of frequencies was found to be independent of the clock speed. 
Figure 3.1 shows the correlation values for the correct key byte guess when the clock 
system takes different frequencies between 1 MHz and 40 MHz.  
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Figure 3.2: Correlation analysis in the frequency domain for 2,048 EM traces using a 
system clock of 1 MHz. 
After setting the clock frequency to 1 MHz, 2,048 traces were captured while the 
microcontroller was running the AES algorithm using 0xA2 as a small part of the key. 
Figure 3.2 shows the absolute values for the matrix of correlation values using one set of 
2,048 EM traces. In this example, it is clear that the correct key guess is A2. The 
maximum correlation is clearly larger than most other correlations, in this case the 
proposed estimation metric produced a “1” for δ=3.8. 
Sometimes it is not clear how to interpret the outcome of the correlation matrix if the 
correct key is unknown. Figure 3.3 illustrates an example where despite finding the 
correct key, it is not clear if the result is meaningful or not since the maximum correlation 
for the correct key is almost the same size as the other correlations. Here the number of 
traces used for the analysis was 55. The accuracy metric was 1 while the estimation 




Figure 3.3: Correlation analysis in the frequency domain for 55 EM traces using a system 
clock of 1 MHz. 
The next set of EM traces were obtained when the microcontroller was using a 24 MHz 
clock. The traces were analyzed using three different correlation methods, correlation 
analysis in the time domain, correlation analysis in the frequency domain and the 
proposed fast correlation in the frequency domain. Figure 3.4 compares the results 
obtained after analyzing from 1 to 100 different traces using each one of the three 
methods. Although correlation analysis in the time domain returns a correct key guess 
with only 10 traces, this result is not robust because with one trace more (11 traces), it 
moves to a wrong key again.  
With around 40 traces, the correlation values for the fast correlation in the frequency 
domain and correlation analysis in the time domain can guess the correct small part of 




Figure 3.4: Accuracy results after processing EM traces from our microcontroller. 
The time required to analyze the acquired traces becomes important when a large 
number of traces (possibly millions) for a large number of possible key guesses and 
points of attack need to be analyzed. Figure 3.5 compares the time required by the three 
different correlation analyses to process one key byte when the microcontroller runs the 
first round of AES. In this analysis, 1 to 500 EM traces were considered. Each EM trace 
contained 5,000 samples. In the case of the fast correlation in the frequency domain, the 
frequencies between 30 MHz and 50 MHz were used and correspond to the frequencies 
where the magnitudes of the power spectrum are larger. The measured times correspond 
to the time it takes for a Matlab implementation of the correlation analysis algorithm to 
run. The figure clearly shows that fast correlation in the frequency domain is the method 
that requires less processing time followed by correlation analysis in the frequency 
domain. The slowest was correlation analysis in the time domain. 
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Figure 3.5: Computation time required to process a given number of traces using different 
correlation methods. 
During the process of acquiring EM and power traces, it is not always possible to have 
a reliable trigger signal attached to the oscilloscope to capture the traces. Thus, trace 
misalignment is an important issue to consider. In addition, some systems use the 
insertion of random delays as a countermeasure. For this reason, the effects of random 
delays on the trace signals were evaluated. Two groups of delays were tested. Delays 
from 0 ns to 20 ns were randomly inserted into traces in one group. In the other group, 
delays from 0 ns to 100 ns were randomly inserted. Figure 3.6 presents the result 
obtained from this analysis. Using correlation analysis in the time domain and random 
delays from 0 ns to 20 ns, 5 times more traces were required to be able to guess the 
correct key. For the delays ranking from 0 ns to 100 ns, it was not possible to guess the 
correct key. For the fast correlation in the frequency domain, the first set of traces with 
delays from 0 ns to 20 ns had no effect on finding the correct key. For the second set it 
took only another 10 traces to be able to guess the correct key.  
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Figure 3.6: Correlation analysis for one key byte using misaligned traces. 
In real attacks of electronic devices, sometimes the key is unknown. In such cases, it is 
very useful to determine the effectiveness of an attack. Figure 3.7 shows the accuracy and 
estimation values obtained after processing a given number of traces using the fast 
correlation in the frequency domain. The accuracy metric shows that after processing the 
first 37 traces, with the fast correlation in the frequency domain the correct key was 
retrieved. In the figure, the changes in accuracy between 30 and 38 traces are visible. The 
main reason is that the exponential structure of accuracy helps us to ignore the “noisy” 
changes, for example, when the correct key changes from position 105 to position 73, and 
lets us focus on more relevant variations like when the correct key guess changes from 
the third position to the first position (36 to 37). The estimation metric (using δ=3.8) 
shows that after processing 55 traces, it is possible to say that independent of the small or 
large correlation values, the result is meaningful. This binary behaviour of estimation will 
help us to determine if an attack is meaningful or not when the key is unknown. 
Changing the value of δ will move the threshold to accept or reject attacks. Further 
research is necessary to determine the optimal value of δ and its independence from the 
device under attack. 
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Figure 3.7: Comparison between the estimated effectiveness and the accuracy for 
different numbers of traces using the fast correlation in the frequency domain. 
3.5.2 Analysis of Traces from the DPA book  
The power traces from Workspace 3 posted at the DPA book home page in (Mangard et 
al. 2010a) are analyzed in this section. Previously in (Mangard et al. 2007) a setup is 
described to perform a power analysis attack on an 8-bit microcontroller that runs at 
11 MHz and executes a software version of AES. The microcontroller is mounted on a 
prototyping board with other basic components. The circuit is powered with a 5 V power 
supply and a resistor of 1 ohm is connected in series with ground. The oscilloscope probe 
is connected to the resistor using a differential probe to measure the voltage on the 
resistor and estimate the power consumption of circuit. The microcontroller 
communicates with a PC through a RS-232 interface. When the PC sends the data block 
to the microcontroller for encryption, the microcontroller activates an output on one of its 
ports previously designed to trigger the oscilloscope and then it starts encrypting the data. 
For Workspace 3, they measure two sets of the power consumption traces of the circuit 
when it encrypts 1,000 random plaintexts, one with perfectly aligned traces (without 
using dummy operations) and one using inserted dummy operations. It uses a software 
implementation of AES that contains 25,000 power samples, when the microcontroller 
runs one round of AES, using the 16 byte key. 


































To analyse the traces using the fast correlation in the frequency domain it was 
necessary to divide the samples from each trace into a number of windows to isolate the 
emissions when the microcontroller is processing one part of the key in one round from 
the emissions of other parts of the key in different rounds. For this 8-bit software 
implementation, the microcontroller processes in each round 16 small parts of the key. 
Hence, 16 or more windows should be used. In this case, the 25,000 samples were 
divided arbitrarily into 40 windows of 625 samples each. This prevents interference 
between frequencies from one part of the program with others. After using correlation 
analysis in the frequency domain, the frequencies that returned the highest correlations 
were identified. From them the ones between 10.5 MHz and 11.5 MHz were used for 
running fast correlation on the frequency domain. The analyses covered the 40 windows 
and the ones with the higher correlations for each key byte were selected as the 
correlation matrix for that key byte guess. In the case of correlation analysis in the time 




Figure 3.8: Correlation frequency analysis using the traces from the DPA book WS3. 
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The accuracy for the two sets of traces, one with no dummy operations and the other 
with dummy operations is compared in Figure 3.8. The effect of the dummy operations 
on the performance of the analysis is visible. In the case of the traces with dummy 
operations, the analysis requires more traces to recover the correct key than with no 
dummy operations. The fast correlation in the frequency domain reaches an accuracy of 
14 with fewer traces than correlation analysis in the time domain. It is interesting how the 
fast correlation in the frequency domain starts with a higher accuracy, then the correlation 
in the time domain moves ahead but it remains almost constant for close to 100 traces, 
then the fast correlation in the frequency domain reaches the accuracy of 14 before the 
time domain. In the case of the traces without dummy operations, correlation analysis in 
the time domain required fewer traces. From the results obtained, it seems that the traces 
from Workspace3 only contain the information for 14 of the 16 bytes of the cipher key. 
3.6 Comparison to Previous Research and Summary 
Unlike previous research that studied correlation analysis in the time domain (Brier et al. 
2004, Mangard, 2004, Ors et al. 2004, Kizhvatov, 2009, Standaert et al. 2004), analysis in 
the frequency domain was also investigated in this chapter (Mateos and Gebotys, 2011). 
A few other works including (Schimmel et al. 2010, Peng et al. 2009) had studied 
correlation analysis in the frequency domain; however, they had utilized all frequencies 
and did not explore the impact of processor clock on the analysis. In this chapter it was 
shown that, independent of the clock frequency, a small number of frequencies are more 
likely to leak computing information. Recent research in (Kasper et al. 2011) and 
(Oswald and Paar, 2011) used correlation analysis in the frequency domain along with 
real time analog filters (custom hardware) which automatically selects the frequencies to 
be considered in the analysis.  
Previous research had suggested metrics such as the success rate (Standaert et al. 
2009), and guessing entropy (Standaert et al. 2009, Kopf and Basin, 2007) but the use of 
the two proposed metrics, accuracy and estimation, help to show the effectiveness of an 
attack with a single value instead of multiple values (one for each subkey attacked). In 
the case of accuracy, it quantifies the correctness of the attack by comparing the key 
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guesses from the attack with the correct cipher key. This is an exponential scale which 
minimizes the weight from the key guesses ranked away from the top positions. In the 
case of estimation, it quantifies the effectiveness of the attack without requiring 
knowledge of the correct key. It estimates the quality of the attack by measuring the 
distance between the maximum correlation and the mean from all maximums. When it is 
bigger than a constant δ, the attack is qualified as meaningful.  
This chapter uses the EM emissions from the AT89C51ED2 microcontroller as an 
example to show that a reduced range of frequencies can be associated with the side 
channel independently of the clock frequency. This fact is the basis of a new 
methodology called fast correlation in the frequency domain. This type of attack requires 
the calculation of smaller correlation matrices compared to correlation analysis in the 
time domain and hence it is faster. It was tested using two different 8-bit processor 
systems and was able to recover the correct keys using EM emissions and power 
consumption traces. The results obtained also show fast correlation in the frequency 
domain is a method immune to misalignments smaller than 20 ns and still able to recover 
the cipher key without problems even up to misalignments of 100 ns. This characteristic 
may support viable attacks on devices that use small random delays as a countermeasure. 
Empirical results show the effectiveness of fast correlation in the frequency domain to 
recover the keys as a reliable method to retrieve the cryptographic keys. The next chapter 




The DPA Contest Version 2 
The DPA contest is an event were researchers around the world have the opportunity to 
compare their side channel attack implementations under equal conditions. It is 
organized by the VLSI research group from the COMELEC department of the Télécom 
ParisTech french University (Bulens et al. 2011). The first edition started in 2008 and 
every year (edition), they switch the contest’s topic. The topic for the DPA contest 
version 2 (DPACv2) (Bulens et al. 2011) was attacking a hardware implementation of 
AES-128. For the contest, 3 different databases, 2 public and 1 private, were prepared. 
The first public database contains 1 million traces acquired using 1 million random 
plaintexts and 1 million random cipher keys. The second public database contains 32 
sets of power traces acquired when the circuit was encrypting 20,000 random plaintexts 
per each one of the 32 cipher keys used. The private database is similar to the second 
public database, however they used different cipher keys and the traces remain private 
to compare the attack submissions. Originally, the DPACv2 had a submission deadline 
of July 14, 2010 and the participants had no knowledge about the performance of other 
submissions. The organization committee decided to extend the period up to 
October 31, 2010, and make public the performance from the original period of the 
attack submissions. This meant that for the extended period, the participants knew 
beforehand the performance from the first period submissions.  
This chapter focuses on the results of an attack submission to the DPACv2, based on 
the proposed fast correlation analysis in the frequency domain sent in before the 
original deadline. To avoid bias in the comparisons among attacks only the submissions 
to the original deadline are considered. An overview of the hardware setup followed by 
a brief summary of the results of the contest using the private database and a 
comparative analysis using the public database is presented. Some of the results 
presented here have been published in (Mateos and Gebotys, 2010) and in the home 




4.1 DPA Contest Setup 
The setup used for acquiring the power traces analysed in the contest included a hardware 
version of AES implemented on the SASEBO GII board (RCIS, 2010). This board 
contains a cryptographic FPGA Xilinx Virtex-5 LX30/LX50 that runs a 128-bit 
implementation of AES without countermeasures. The board uses a 24 MHz crystal and 
the circuit runs one round of AES per clock cycle. The power traces were acquired using 
a digital oscilloscope with a sampling resolution of 5 GS/s and each trace contains 3,253 
samples (the 10 rounds of AES in 0.65 µs). From the headers in the trace data files, it is 
possible to assume each plaintext was encrypted 10 times using the same cipher key and 
the oscilloscope recorded the average of those 10 traces. 
The way in which an interface program, called the “attack wrapper” interacts with the 
submitted attack program is described in the documentation part of the DPACv2 
homepage. In the case of windows based submissions the attack wrapper was 
implemented using C# and consists of a small application that provides the attacking 
program with the plaintexts, ciphertexts, and power traces that must be analysed.  
The attack wrapper is configured with the number keys that will be analyzed (0 to 31), 
the number of traces to be used by the attack program, the name of the output file, the 
directory where the trace files are stored and the round of interest in the attack program. 
Then, the attack wrapper creates an instance of the class Trace (trace) that contains 3 
properties: plaintext, ciphertext, and samples. The plaintexts and ciphertexts are arrays of 
16 bytes, while “samples” is an array of 6,506 bytes (2 bytes per 3,253 samples). The 
attack wrapper loads into the object trace the values for the first test and passes the trace 
to the attacker. The wrapper records the starting time and waits for a response from the 
attacker. When it receives a response, it saves the results of the attack, records the ending 
time and subtracts the starting time from the ending time. This keeps track of the answers 
and the processing time. Then, the attack wrapper loads the next values into trace and 
passes the object to the attacker for the next test. This cycle continues until the program 




The responses from the attacker are required to be a matrix of 16 columns by 256 rows 
where each column corresponds to one byte of the small part of the key associated to one 
of the s-boxes and every row contains the key guesses sorted from most likely (row 1) to 
less likely (row 256).  
The attack submitted to the DPA contest focused on the last round of AES encryption 
and a hypothetical power consumption model based on the Hamming weight was 
selected. Using the traces from the public database and simple power analysis, a region 
where the last round would most likely occur was determined. This region was found 
between samples 2,600 and 3,000. Then correlation analysis in the frequency domain was 
applied to analyze the traces from the public database. A range of select frequencies was 
determined where bigger magnitudes for the correct key guess were obtained compared 
to other key guesses. This pre-characterization found that the frequencies between 9 MHz 
and 20 MHz returned the best results.  
4.2 DPA Contest Results 
The results of the attack are evaluated using another program called Compute-Results. 
This program reads the results saved by the attack wrapper. It reads the plaintexts and 
encrypts them using AES and the cipher key registered in the results file. Compute-
Results stores the partial result at the round the attack program is aiming, and searches for 
the position of the correct values in the responses sent by the attack program. Compute-
Results measures the partial success rate, partial guessing entropy, global success rate, 
and execution time. According to (Standaert et al. 2009) the partial success rate contains 
the first-order success rate sampled from 32 experiments and calculated for each of the 16 
bytes of the AES subkey. The partial guessing entropy uses the guessing entropy as a 
metric and the global success rate measures the first-order success rate in covering the 


















































































































Alexis Bonnecaze, IML, ERISCS, Attack DPA, 0.41 0.75 1.72 < 0.01 s 
Alexis Bonnecaze, IML, ERISCS, Attack SPE 0.88 0.94 1.06 0.83 s 
Alexis Bonnecaze, IML, ERISCS, Attack VAR 0.53 0.69 9.16 < 0.01 s 
Alexis Bonnecaze, IML, ERISCS, Attack VDPA 0.25 0.53 5.22 < 0.01 s 
Alexis Bonnecaze, IML, ERISCS, Attack CVM 0.44 0.69 6.56 0.31 s 
Antoine Wurcker, UNILIM: Faculte des 
Sciences et Techniques de Limoges, Attack A 
0.81 0.88 1.16 0.25 s 
Antoine Wurcker, UNILIM: Faculte des 
Sciences et Techniques de Limoges, Attack B 
0.69 0.88 1.16 0.25 s 
Aziz El Aabid, Télécom ParisTech, Template 
Attack 
0.19 0.35 37.84 0.05 s 
Edgar Mateos, University of Waterloo, Fast 
correlation in the frequency domain. 
0.59 0.78 3.41 < 0.01 s 
Matthieu Walle, Thales Communications, 
Attack 7F 
0.94 0.94 1.09 0.07 s 
Matthieu Walle, Thales Communications, 
Attack 7T 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.03 s 
Matthieu Walle, Thales Communications, 
Attack 9F 
0.94 0.94 1.09 0.07 s 
Matthieu Walle, Thales Communications, 
Attack 9T 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.04 s 
Maël Berthier, MORPHO, Attack CPA 0.88 0.94 1.06 4.52 s 
Sylvain Guilley, Télécom ParisTech, Reference 
Attack 
0.53 0.81 40.25 1.10 s 
Thanh-Ha Le, MORPHO, Attack MI cumulant 
4th order 
0.68 0.82 1.74 8.77 s 
Thanh-Ha Le, MORPHO, Attack MI cumulant 0.88 0.91 1.44 7.24 s 
The complete report with the results from all attacks submitted to the DPACv2 can be 
found online at (Bulens et al. 2011). Table 4.1 presents a summary of the results for the 
attacks submitted in the first (original) period of the contest and is based on the DPACv2 
hall of fame results (Bulens et al. 2011). There are four attacks that require less than 0.01 
seconds to process each trace, three are written in C++ (DPA, VAR, and VDPA) and one 




one that uses the proposed fast correlation analysis in the frequency domain obtains the 
top global success rate; it has the best minimum-partial success rate, and returns the 
second best maximum partial guessing entropy. 
The global success rate for the fast correlation analysis in the frequency domain is 
shown in Figure 4.1, the success rate starts increasing after 6,000 traces, between 11,000 
and 14,000 traces it presents few fluctuations and stops at 0.59 for 20,000 traces. It means 
that 59% of all small parts of the key were guessed correctly with 20,000 traces. 
 
Figure 4.1 Results from the DPACv2 with the global success rate entropy for all the 
subkeys bytes (Bulens et al. 2011) 
The partial success rate reported in the DPACv2 for the fast correlation analysis in the 
frequency domain attack is shown in Figure 4.2. With 3,000 traces it was possible to 
obtain the small part of the correct key used in some of the S-boxes. With 20,000 traces 
only 4 S-boxes did not reach a success rate of 1, being the minimum-partial success rate 
for 20,000 traces 0.78 (as reported in Table 4.1). The average value for the partial success 





Figure 4.2 Results from the DPACv2 with the partial success rate for all the subkeys 
bytes (Bulens et al. 2011) 
 
Figure 4.3 Results from the DPACv2 with the partial guessing entropy for all the subkeys 





The partial guessing entropy across the number of traces is shown in Figure 4.3. As 
expected, the guessing entropy starts around 128 (random guess 50-50) and starts 
decreasing close to 1, where 1 means a correct guess. In Table 4.1 the value reported for 
the maximum-partial guessing entropy after 20,000 traces using the fast correlation 
analysis in the frequency domain is 3.41; however, one parameter that could be more 
representative of the partial guessing entropy is the mean instead of the maximum. The 
mean of the partial guessing entropy at 20,000 traces is 1.2.  
4.3 DPA Contest Public Database 
This section uses the traces of the DPACv2 public database to illustrate the performance 
of two types of correlation analysis discussed in Chapter 3, correlation analysis in the 
time domain and fast correlation in the frequency domain. Both attacks aim at the last 
round of AES encryption and for fast correlation in the frequency domain, the analysis 
takes into consideration the frequencies between 9 MHz and 20 MHz.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Correlation frequency analysis using the traces from the DPA contest public 
database. 






























DPA contest key 31 public set 
Fast correlation in the frequency domain 




The results of the attacks using fast correlation in the frequency domain and correlation 
analysis in the time domain are compared in Figure 4.4. The metric applied was accuracy. 
The traces used correspond to the cipher key number 31 and the figure shows better 
accuracy for the fast correlation in the frequency domain than the correlation analysis in 
the time domain. With fast correlation in the frequency domain, it was possible to guess 
the complete 128 bits of the cipher key using less than 5,000 power traces. 
 
Figure 4.5: Processing time required to compute correlation analysis using traces from 
the DPA contest public database. 
One of the objectives for developing fast correlation in the frequency domain was to 
reduce the processing time required to analyze a set of power traces. It is interesting to 
note that one of the latest requirements of the DPACv2 asked for the participants to 
process 20,000 traces in less than 48 hours. The time to compute each analysis using 
correlation analysis in the time domain and fast correlation in the frequency domain is 
compared in Figure 4.5. It shows the computation time to perform correlation analysis 
using a different number of traces. In the top, a linear scale is presented and in the bottom 
a semi-log scale is used to read the processing times for fast correlation in the frequency 
domain. Fast correlation in the frequency domain requires 0.7457 seconds to process 
6,000 traces with an accuracy of 16 (finding all the 16 bytes) while using correlation 
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analysis in the time domain, it takes 276.5 seconds to process 6,000 traces with an 
accuracy of 10.45. 
The accuracy results obtained after processing the 32 different keys of the DPA contest 
public database using fast correlation analysis in the frequency domain are presented in 
Figure 4.6. The graph shows the evolution from 1 to 10,000 traces with increments of 100 
traces. We can observe that after processing 6,000 traces the average accuracy is close to 
14 and after 10,000 is close to 15. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Accuracy results using the fast correlation in the frequency domain using 
power traces from the DPA contest public database. 
Sometimes the correct key is unknown and it is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness 
of an attack. In these cases the use of the metric called estimation may help. In the case of 
the traces from key 31 using δ=3.8, the values obtained for estimation and accuracy are 
shown in Figure 4.7. In the figure, the similarity of the two metrics is close enough to 
forecast what would be the effectiveness of the attack if the correct key were unknown. It 
is also visible that based upon the value of estimation using 5,000 traces, the attackers 
could predict that they found the correct key (and in fact they have found the key). 





































Figure 4.7: Comparison between the estimated effectiveness and the accuracy for 
different numbers of traces from the DPA contest using fast correlation in the frequency 
domain. 
4.4 Comparison to Previous Research and Summary  
A brief summary of the results of the proposed fast correlation analysis submitted to 
DPACv2 is presented in this chapter. The attack called correlation analysis in the 
frequency domain was the fastest of all the attacks submitted and among the fastest 
attacks, it had the best success rate at 20,000 traces. It was able to retrieve a number of 
128-bit cipher keys using traces from the public and private database. Hence, using a 
reduced range of frequencies, it is possible to attack a 128-bit implementation of AES 
without countermeasures when it runs in the cryptographic Xilinx Virtex-5 LX30/LX50 
FPGA. The most accurate analysis in the competition used on average 0.03 seconds while 
our technique required less than 0.01 seconds (the minimum discriminate in the measured 
time was 0.01 s. Comparing the processing time between fast correlation in the frequency 
domain and correlation analysis in the time domain, the first one is approximately 370 
times faster and has better accuracy. Additionally, an example is presented where using 
the estimation metric the effectiveness of an attack could be forecast without knowing the 
correct key guess. An alternative EM probe that uses giant magnetoresistors is described 
in the next chapter.  
Number of traces 

















































Side Channel Analysis using Giant Magneto-Resistive 
Sensors 
This chapter explores the use of Giant Magneto-Resistive (GMR) sensors in the field of 
side channel analysis. First, a brief introduction about the Giant Magneto-Resistive 
phenomenon is presented. Then, using a commercial EM inductive probe of 1 cm in 
diameter and a GMR, a number of EM traces are acquired and analysed. These traces 
were obtained from the 8-bit microcontroller AT89C51ED when it was running a 
software version of AES. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the use of this microcontroller is 
of particular interest for this research considering the JCOP30 and JCOP41 Java Cards 
are based on extended architectures of the 8051’s microcontroller (NXP, 2009c). For 
the evaluation of the GMR probe, four different sampling rates were used ranging from 
500 MS/s to 50 MS/s and the results were compared with those from a commercial 
probe with performance that is well documented (Electro-Metrics Inc., 2004) and has 
been effective in the search of side channel analysis (Mateos and Gebotys, 2010), 
(Gebotys, 2006), (Gebotys et al. 2005). The acquired traces are analysed in the time 
and frequency domain. Most of the work presented in this chapter has been presented in 
(Mateos and Gebotys, 2011). 
5.1 Introduction to GMR 
The use of electromagnetic emissions to recover cryptographic information has been 
extensively exploited, such as research in (Messerges et al. 2002, Oswald and Paar 
2011, Quisquater and Samyde 2001, Gandolfi et al. 2001, Agrawal et al. 2002, 
Carluccio et al. 2005, Mateos and Gebotys 2010, Thanh-Ha Le et al. 2006, Kizhvatov, 
2009, Kasper et al. 2009, Le et al. 2008, Peng et al. 2009, Gebotys et al. 2005, Aerts et 
al. 2006, Chen et al. 2008, Kasper et al. 2011, Mangard, 2003, Plos et al. 2008, 
Yamaguchi et al. 2010). The effects of EM sensors in side channel analysis have been 




the most effective near field probes were those made of a small plate of a highly 
conducting metal like silver or copper attached to a coaxial cable. In (Gandolfi et al. 
2001) different types of sensors were studied including integrated inductors and magnetic 
loops, but the best EM signals were collected using handmade coils made of copper 
whose diameter varied from 150 microns to 500 microns. Research in (Quisquater and 
Samyde, 2001) used flat coils positioned with a motorized table that set the sensor with 
micrometric precision. Other researchers (Aerts et al. 2006) studied different topologies 
of EM probes trying to identify the shape that delivers the best results. Others 
(Yamaguchi et al. 2010) implemented an inductive square shape probe of 180 µm by 
180 µm in a LSI circuit. Most of the work done in EM side channel analysis focused on 
the use of inductive probes and the use of the giant magnetoresistive (GMR) effect has 
not been investigated for side channel analysis. 
Lord Kelvin documented the magnetoresistance phenomenon in 1857. The giant 
magnetoresistance was discovered by Peter Grünberg and Albert Fert in the late 1980s 
and is widely used in the read head of hard disc drives (Kasap, 2006), (Mallinson, 2002). 
The word “giant” refers to the large change in resistance that occurs in these devices 
(10% to 20%) when they are in the presence of a magnetic field. The basic structure of 
these devices is two ferromagnetic metal films (such as Fe or Co or their alloys, etc.) 
separated by a metallic nonmagnetic film (such as Cu). The magnetic layers are thin (less 
than 10 nm) and the nonmagnetic layer is thinner (Kasap, 2006).  
In the absence of external magnetic fields, the magnetic moment of the layers adjacent 
to the copper face different directions, due to the antiferromagnetic coupling of the built 
device. Normally, copper is a good conductor; however, when it is a few atoms thick, 
electron scattering increases its resistance notoriously. This resistance depends on the 
relative orientation of the electron spins next to the thin copper layer. When an external 
magnetic field is applied and the magnetic moments of the adjacent layers are aligned in 




5.2 Preliminary Results using Giant Magneto-Resistive Sensors 
The AT89C51ED2 microcontroller within the Keil MCB251 evaluation board was used 
to analyze the performance of the GMR and inductive probes. The board uses a 24 MHz 
crystal, thus in consideration of the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem, the EM traces 
were captured using different resolutions above 2 times the clock frequency. The 
resolutions analyzed include 500 MS/s, 250 MS/s, 125 MS/s, and 50 MS/s. The probes 
used were the commercial 1 cm loop EM probe and the GMR probe. The GMR probe 
uses the NVA AB001-02 sensor (NVE). This sensor has two pairs of unshielded resistors 
in a Wheatstone bridge configuration. It comes in a surface mounted, 8 pin package 
(MSOP8) and one pair of the resistors are located on the area among the pins 1, 2, 7, and 
8 while the other is in the area among the pins 3, 4, 5, and 6 (NVE). The point between 
pins 1, 2, 7, and 8 is referred in this research as the position point of the GMR probe. The 
commercial inductive probe was placed on top of the microcontroller and was manually 
moved searching for a point where the magnitude of the EM signals increased while the 
microcontroller was continuously writing and reading from the memory. The GMR probe 
was positioned in the same area as the inductive probe and the axis of sensitivity was 
shifted to form a 45°angle with respect to the edges of the microcontroller. In this way, 
the sensor was able to detect 70.7% of the magnetic field coming from the X and Y axis. 
For example, placing the sensor parallel to one of the axes let say X, it would ignore the 
magnetic field coming from the opposite axis (Y). The attack focus was the 
microcontroller processing one byte of the key during the first round of AES. For the 
cases of 500 MS/s, 250 MS/s, and 125 MS/s, the results were verified utilizing 10 sets of 
2,048 traces each. For the sampling rate of 50 MS/s, 50 sets of 2,048 traces were used. 





Figure 5.1: Picture of the evaluation board used showing the position  
of the GMR probe (left ). Close up of the GMR probe (right) 
5.2.1 Correlation Analysis in the Time Domain 
In the case of correlation analysis in the time domain, different sets of traces captured 
using the inductive probe (EM Probe) and the GRM probe were analysed. Table 5.1 
presents the maximum values of the correlation matrix when the EM traces obtained with 
the inductive and GMR probe are analysed using correlation analysis in the time domain. 
In the table, most of the correlation values for the inductive probe are larger than those 
for the GMR probe. However, in the case of the GMR probe, the correct key was 
recovered in all the cases, even where the inductive probe failed in 39 of 50 experiments 
with a sampling resolution of 50 MS/s. The analysis in the time domain was successful in 
recovering the correct key in all the cases for both probes using resolutions of 500 MS/s, 






Table 5.1: Maximum correlation for the time domain analysis  
Correlation coefficients in the time domain  
Sampling frequency 
[MS/s] 
EM probe  GMR probe 
500 0.913 0.523 
250 0.708 0.426 





 Able to recover the correct key in only 11 of 50 
experiments. 
Next, correlation values for the extreme cases of 500 MS/s and 50 MS/s were explored. 
Figure 5.2 shows the values of the correlation matrix for the case of 500 MS/s, using the 
EM probe and correlation analysis in the time domain. In this case, a clear spike appears 
at 7.35 µs for the key guess 162. It is evident that it corresponds to the correct value of 
the key. 
 
Figure 5.2: Correlation matrix in the time domain for 2,048 traces using EM probe and a 





Figure 5.3: Correlation matrix in the time domain for 2,048 traces using the GMR probe 
and a sampling frequency of 500 MS/s. 
The maximum correlation for the GMR probe using correlation analysis in the time 
domain is shown in Figure 5.3. Similar to the inductive probe the maximum correlation 
of 0.523 occurs at 7.35 µs. However, with the GMR probe a second spike is visible for 
the same correct key guess (162) at 7.032 µs. 
 
Figure 5.4: Correlation matrix in the time domain for 2,048 traces using EM probe and a 
sampling frequency of 50 MS/s. The analysis returns a wrong key. 
The correlation results after using 2,048 traces acquired using an inductive probe and a 




maximum correlation of 0.0932 at 2.42 µs. In this case, correlation analysis in the time 
domain using the inductive probe was unable to recover the correct key (162).  
 
Figure 5.5: Correlation matrix in the time domain for 2,048 traces using the GMR probe 
and a sampling frequency of 50 MS/s. 
For the case of the 50 MS/s using the GMR probe, Figure 5.5 shows the correct key 
guess (162) with a spike at 7.35 µs. As expected it is located at the same time where other 
analyses with higher resolutions revealed the correct key. It is important to emphasize the 
clarity of this result considering the proximity to the minimum sampling rate according to 
the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem. For this scenario, 50 sets of 2,048 traces were 
captured. In the 50 experiments, the GMR probe was able to guess the correct key at all 
the times. In the same scenario, the inductive probe failed to recover the correct key in 39 
of the 50 experiments. 
5.2.2 Correlation Analysis in the Frequency Domain 
For correlation analysis in the frequency domain, the same EM traces were analysed as in 
the case of the time domain analysis. Table 5.2 presents the maximum values from the 
correlation matrix when the traces were analysed in the frequency domain. The respective 





Table 5.2: Maximum correlation values for the frequency domain analysis 
Correlation coefficients in the frequency domain 
Sampling frequency 
[MS/s] 
EM probe GMR probe 
500 0.680 0.370 
250 0.435 0.320 







 Able to recover the correct key in only 7 of 50 experiments. 
For the sampling rates of 500 MS/s, 250 MS/s and 125 MS/s it was possible to recover 
the correct key using both probes. For the sampling rate of 50 MS/s the GMR and the 
inductive probe were able to recover the correct key in 7 of 50 experiments.  
The correlation matrix plot for the inductive probe using a sampling rate of 500 MS/s 
is shown in Figure 5.6. It shows that the frequencies between 15 and 70 MHz present the 
higher correlations for the correct key guess, where the maximum occurs at 41.52 MHz. 
 
Figure 5.6: Correlation matrix in the frequency domain for 2,048 traces using EM probe 





Figure 5.7: Correlation matrix in the frequency domain for 2,048 traces using GMR probe 
and a sampling frequency of 500 MS/s. 
The values obtained after analyzing the traces obtained with the GMR probe, with a 
sampling rate of 500 MS/s are presented in Figure 5.7. In this case, the correct key was 
retrieved and the range of frequencies with higher correlations for the correct key are 
between 1 MHz and 33 MHz. 
 
Figure 5.8: Correlation matrix in the frequency domain for 2,048 traces using EM probe 
and a sampling frequency of 50 MS/s. 
The results obtained after analyzing the EM traces with the inductive probe captured 




result of the 7 cases where it was possible to guess the correct key. Here the maximum 
correlation appeared at 18.5 MHz.  
 
Figure 5.9: Correlation matrix in the frequency domain for 2,048 traces using GMR probe 
and a sampling frequency of 50 MS/s. 
The correlation values for the frequency domain analysis using the GMR traces 
acquired with 50 MS/s resolution is represented in Figure 5.9. The figure shows the 
maximum correlation in the correlation matrix with a magnitude of 0.11 and corresponds 
to the frequency of 18.53 MHz. In this analysis, similar to the EM probe, only 7 of 50 
experiments were able to recover the correct key. 
5.3 Comparison to Previous Research and Summary 
Previous research has studied the effects of different sensors in side channel analysis 
(Quisquater and Samyde 2001, Gandolfi et al. 2001, Agrawal et al. 2002, Aerts et al. 
2006, Chen et al. 2008, Yamaguchi et al. 2010), but all these works utilized only 
inductive probes of different sizes and materials. The giant magnetoresistance GMR 
effect has not been previously investigated for side channel analysis. A comparative 
analysis between an inductive EM probe and a new type of probe that uses a giant 
magnetoresistance (GMR) sensor was presented in this chapter. The results show 
successful attacks on an 8-bit software implementation of AES using the GMR probe in 




analysis of the traces obtained with the GMR probe were able to recover the correct key 
in the time domain for all cases while in the case of the inductive probe using 50 MS/s it 
recovers the correct key in only 11 out of 50 experiments. Although the correlation 
analysis for the traces acquired using an inductive probe show higher magnitudes, the 
axis of sensitivity of the GMR probe was rotated 45° with respect to the edges of the 
microcontroller and the sensor was detecting 70.7% of the magnetic field. 
Using correlation analysis in the frequency domain, it was possible to recover the 
correct key when the traces acquired had a sampling resolution of 500 MS/s, 250 MS/s 
and 125 MS/s independently of the type of probe used. In the case of the 50 MS/s both 
probes succeeded in 7 out of 50 cases. In all the cases tested, the traces with higher 
resolution returned bigger correlations. However, to test the boundaries of the GMR 
probe, low resolutions were considered as well. The results presented in this chapter do 
not imply the replacement of inductive EM probes by GMR probes, but further research 
on the effects of some properties of the side channel analysis such as their ability to react 
to magnetic fields in some directions and their response gradient of magnetic fields is 
recommended. In the next chapter the setup used to study possible side channel from the 






Experimental Setup for Java Card Analysis 
In this section, the main experimental setup used to investigate the security of the 
JCOP30 and JCOP41 Java Cards when they are working in contactless mode and running 
a Java cryptographic algorithm is described. Acquiring the proper set of power or EM 
power traces is fundamental yet challenging for side channel analysis of real embedded 
systems. The proposed setup aims to improve the quality of the EM traces acquired for 
analysis. In Chapter 5, a new EM probe was presented that is used in this study; however, 
there are other factors that also affect the characteristics of the acquired traces. These 
factors include the position of the EM probe, the program implementation used, the 
sampling rate applied, etc. In this chapter, the modifications made to the commercial card 
reader are explained. The electronic circuit developed to trigger the oscilloscope using 
the signals coming from a commercial smartcard reader is also described. Additionally, 
the programs used in the card and some characteristics of the oscilloscope used to acquire 
traces are briefly illustrated. 
6.1 Card Reader Modifications 
The quality of an EM trace is fundamental to side channel analysis. In Chapter 3, the EM 
principles which form the basis of EM power analysis were reviewed. One factor that 
determines the magnitude of the EM field is the distance between the emitter and the 
receptor. Consequently, the position of the probe is essential. For this reason, the first 
modification to the card reader is intended to assist in the placement of the EM probe. 
The second change improves the quality of the card reader’s power supply by changing 
its connection from the computer USB port to a lab power supply. The third change, 
consists of replacing the card reader’s internal clock (a surface mount IC) with a more 
robust and stable signal generator. 
6.1.1 The Axis Table.  
One of the objectives of this research is to explore the security of the smart cards when 




smart card with respect to the card reader and the position of the EM probe. Previous 
research has pointed out the importance of setting the position of the sensor with 
micrometric precision and worked on a motorized table that moved the sensor above the 
chip using stepper engines to control the position of the screws (Quisquater and Samyde, 
2001). In other work, (Kresalek et al. 2008) developed a semiautomatic measurement 
system to determine the radiating parts of an electronic device. In this case, an XY plotter 
controlled with a programmable DC power supply is used to position their 2 mm near-
field probe. With their setup the maximum resolution to place the probe is 0.02 mm. 
 
Figure 6.1: CardMan 5121, dual interface card reader 
The commercial card reader used in this study is the Omnikey CardMan 5121 
(OMNIKEY, 2005). This device has a curved shape cover that makes it difficult to hold 
smart cards at the same point all the time (see Figure 6.1). To overcome this situation the 
card reader was removed from its plastic case and placed onto a coordinates table. The 
board has a space to hold the card reader in such a way that the smart cards can be placed 
on top of the card reader with minimal variation. In addition, it has two rails that help to 
slide a connection grid in the X-axis. The connection grid is an interface that helps 
combine the movement of the sensor in the X and Y directions. It consists of a “number 
sign” shape made by a pair of X-axis rails fixed orthogonally to another pair of Y-axis 
rails. On top of this connection grid, the base of the sensor, which has two Y-axis rails 
that support moving the sensor in the Y-axis, is placed. Figure 6.2 shows the way the 3 





To reduce the interference with the electric and magnetic field of the card reader and 
smart card, the axis table was built avoiding metallic materials. Melamine was selected 
for the board and wood for the rails. Figure 6.3 illustrates the home made axis table. This 
setup made it possible to manually place the sensor and the card in specific points and 
record their positions using a calliper with a precision of ±0.1 mm.  









  Y-axis rails 
Smartcard 





Figure 6.3: Axis table developed to place the smart card and EM sensor. 
6.1.2 Power Supplies 
The card reader uses the Vcc connection from the USB port to supply energy to all its 
internal circuits. One of these circuits is the Multiple Protocol Contactless Reader IC 
(CL RC632) (NXP, 2009b). It modulates and demodulates all communication between 
the smart card and the card reader. One section of this circuit corresponds to the 
transmitter control which is connected to a couple of buffers that deliver the modulated 
13.56 MHz energy carrier to the antenna. These buffers require a transmitter power 
supply. In the case of the card reader, this pin is connected to the Vcc from the USB port. 
The Vcc from the USB port is connected to the power supply of the computer and 
despite all its filters, the output voltage contains a number of harmonics having a 
maximum variation measured with the oscilloscope of 960 mV peak to peak. These 
values exceed the ±5% tolerance established by the IEC 61967-1 standard (IEC, 2002). 
This standard describes the conditions for measurement of conducted and radiated 
electromagnetic disturbances on integrated circuits. To reduce the variability and avoid 
these harmonics that distort the carrier’s waveform, the card reader was connected to an 




6235A and 6323A were tested, and the model 6235A was selected for the experiments 
since it offered the best results by reducing the noise from 960 mV to less than 80 mV 
peak to peak.  
6.1.3 Signal Generator 
The Multiple Protocol Contactless Reader IC (CL RC632) is the circuit used by the card 
reader to communicate with the smart card in contactless mode. This circuit requires a 
13.56 MHz oscillator. In the case of the card reader used for this research, the oscillator 
used is the IC surface mount LIM-T 13560 KDK 5e. This crystal has a frequency stability 
of ±50 ppm (0.005%=3.7 ps). After detecting the trigger sequence, it is necessary to hold 
the oscilloscope trigger approximately 1.5 ms before starting the acquisitions of the EM 
power traces. Using the oscilloscope to measure the variation time, the measurements 
indicate an average misalignment of ±3 ns. 
To improve the quality of the card reader’s carrier, the crystal oscillator was replaced 
with a 13.56 MHz sine signal generated with a R&S SMA 100A signal generator. The 
resulting signal has a jitter smaller than 19 fs when working at 13.56 MHz.  
6.2 Triggering the Oscilloscope  
Triggering the oscilloscope at the correct time is one of the most important elements for 
acquiring meaningful power and EM power traces for side channel analysis. A proper 
trigger helps to acquire the intended traces and to reduce misalignments among them. In 
the case of smart cards, they do not have physical connections to trigger a signal for the 
oscilloscope. In (Mangard, 2003), the author could not find a trigger for the 
oscilloscope based on the far field radiated emissions. Instead, they used a trigger that 
was connected physically with the card reader because they found it “impossible” to 
locate a trigger for the oscilloscope based on the radiated emissions. 
6.2.1 Using the Pause at the Start of a Command Transmission 
One approach to trigger the oscilloscope is using the “pause” at the start of a command 
transmission. As described in Section 2.3.1, the Java Cards analyzed use the ISO 14443-2 




modulation. A pause is when the carrier’s voltage reduces to less than 5% of its initial 
value for an interval between 0.5 µs to 3 µs. For triggering the oscilloscope, the voltage 
of the carrier is monitored continuously and when the oscilloscope detects a pause, a 
trigger event is generated. The oscilloscope will not accept another trigger until the card 
finishes receiving the command, processing the data, and transmitting a response to the 
card reader. A similar approach was used in (Berkes, 2008) to trigger the instrument.  
This implementation is simple and only requires programming the trigger event in the 
oscilloscope. One disadvantage of this approach is that the oscilloscope will trigger at the 
beginning of any command coming from the card reader independently of whether it is an 
idle command or any other command. Thus, this issue creates uncertainty about which 
command generated the trigger.  
6.2.2 Using a Customized Circuit for Triggering  
A more robust approach for triggering the oscilloscope consists of starting the 
acquisitions after a programmed sequence of commands occurs. For this purpose an 
electronic circuit that decodes the transmission commands and decides when to trigger or 
not depending on the present command and previous trigger events was developed. This 
design prevents triggering on out of sequence or unexpected plaintext/ciphertext 
(including idle commands).  
The ASK decoder designed contains two main modules; a reader decoder that 
demodulates the card reader carrier and produces 9-bit words; and a 32-bit 
microcontroller that reads the 9-bit words and runs a C program to determine when and if 
to trigger. The circuit was implemented in an Altera DE2 board using the Cyclone II 
FPGA. The reader decoder is based on a number of frequency dividers and the trigger 
controller uses a 32-bit microcontroller based on the NIOS II CPU.  
6.3 Oscilloscope Acquisition Modes 
The oscilloscope setup supports the capture of multiple traces and their storage in 
memory for future processing (Tektronix, 2003). One trace is the set of signal samples 




set of traces captured by the active channels and it is possible to have more than one trace 
in one frame; however, it is only possible to store one single channel at a time in a file 
hence each frame stored contains one trace. The oscilloscope has a function called 
FastFrame
TM
 which in a single sequence acquisition allows the capture of x number of 
frames after their respective triggers. These frames can be later stored as a single file and 
are referred to in this research as file acquisitions. The physical memory of the 
oscilloscope supports the acquisition of a maximum of 32,000,000 sample points, which 
can be distributed in 1 trace of 32 M samples, or 2 of 16 M samples, all the way up to 
64,000 traces of 500 samples. The maximum captured time depends on the resolution 
used. In this research, primarily resolutions of 500 MS/s and 250 MS/s were used. 
The oscilloscope has three main modes of acquiring traces: sample mode, peak 
detection mode, and high-resolution mode. In sample mode, the oscilloscope does not 
post-process the acquired traces. In peak detection mode, it alternates between saving 
the lowest and the highest value every two acquisition intervals, where an acquisition 
interval refers to the waveform duration divided by the record length. For 
high-resolution mode, the instrument calculates the average of all samples taken during 
an acquisition interval. All acquisitions used in this research were taken using sampling 
mode unless otherwise stated.  
6.4 Applet Used for Analysis 
As explained in Section 2.4.1 and later used in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, the implementations 
of AES are typically focused on the attack of the S-boxes. In attacks presented in 
Chapters 3 and 5, the AES implementation is attacked in the first round while in 
Chapter 4, an attack on the last round is presented. When the attack occurs in round 1, the 
intermediate result attacked is a function of 1 byte of plaintext exclusive-ored by 1 byte 
of the secret key.  
When the electronic device under study uses a precharged bus, the hypothetical power 
model after the SubBytes transformations corresponds to the Hamming weight of the S-
box result (Brier et al. 2004). In the case of a nonprecharged bus, the previous state of the 




estimate the power model. In the case of the smart cards used, the information about the 
type of bus used was not available. Thus, to improve the likelihood of an attack, the 
running program writes a value of 0x00 into a variable and next it writes the result of the 
S-box(plaintext  key) into the same variable. 
6.4.1 Timing and Resources Constraints 
To launch an attack, it is first necessary to determine the times when the card is 
processing the cryptographic information. According to the data sheets of the Java 
Cards under study (NXP, 2009a), it is likely that they use some undisclosed DPA 
countermeasures. Using simple power analysis and differential power analysis, some 
points of interest (POI) that indicated the time at which AES was entering the S-boxes 
as mentioned in (Baer et al. 2010) were analysed but did not produce any connection to 
the keys. 
The JCOP30 Java Card does not contain a hardware implementation of AES (Philips, 
2003) and while the specification sheet from the JCOP41 (Philips, 2006) refers to an AES 
coprocessor, a Java Card forum hosted by Oracle points out that the hardware version of 
AES was accidentally switched off during the production (Anonymous, 2009) and cannot 
be re-enabled (Svenda, 2009). The unoptimized software implementation of AES that 
was prepared takes approximately 3 seconds for enciphering a 128-bit plaintext using 
JCOP30. This means that using the whole 32,000,000 sample points from the 
oscilloscope and a sampling resolution of 500 MS/s, it would be possible to capture only 
6.4% of the full encryption time. To delimit a possible time of attack, a Java applet that 
runs only the first SubByte transformation from the first round was developed. The smart 
card receives a plaintext and using a small part of the key, it writes into a variable V the 
result of the SubByte transformation from the plaintext exclusive-ored with the small part 
of the key. Algorithm 6.1 describes how applet test 1 works. Step 5 of the algorithm 
sends the value V to the card reader and verifies what value was received and processed 
by the smart card. In this way, one detects when the smart card misses a command and 





Algorithm 6.1: Applet test 1 (S-box one iteration) 
Input: Plaintext P, Cipher key k (stored in the smart card) 
Output: Intermediate value V 
1:  Read plaintext P from card reader  
2:  Compute Value=SubByte(P xor k) 
3:  V=0 
4:  V=Value 
5:  Send V to card reader 
6.4.2 Processing Times 
For the JCOP30, the required time to run the applet test 1 is equal to 1,247.64 µs. This 
time was measured from the point the card reader ends the command transmission to the 
time the card reader receives the start of the response from the smart card. Using a 
sampling rate of 500 MS/s, it would be possible to acquire up to 51 traces from the 
emissions associated with applet test 1. The inconvenience of this approach is that the 
POI does not suggest a stable point of attack and most of the time required by the applet 
corresponds to reading the plaintext from the Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) 
buffer and to prepare the buffer for the response.  
To increase the number of events where the card is using the result of the S-box, a Java 
applet test based on Algorithm 6.2 was implemented. Here the variable V is cleared and 
later the result of the SubByte transformation is written to it. This write command is 
repeated 20 times before the result is transmitted to the card reader. The value of 20 
repetitions was selected discretionally to guarantee the measurements are recorded in 
Steps 3 and 4 of Algorithm 6.2 and not in Step 6, when the card is sending the response 





Algorithm 6.2: Applet test 2 (S-box 21 iterations) 
Input: Plaintext P, Cipher key k (stored in the smart card) 
Output: Intermediate value V 
1:  Receive plaintext P from card reader  
2:  Compute Value=SubByte(P xor k) 
3:  V=0 
4:  V=Value 
5:  Repeat 20 times Steps 3 and 4 
6:  Send V to card reader 
 
For the case of the applet test 2, the processing time is 4,929.64 µs. Combining this with 
the results for applet test 1, this means that each cycle of calculating the result of the S-
box and writing into a variable takes approximately 181 µs. To identify one possible time 
of attack, the window time between 1,400 µs and 1,600 µs was selected. In this interval, 
at least, one complete cycle of clearing and writing into the variable the result of the 
SubByte transformation occurs. One important point to consider is that the programmer 
of the Java Cards has no control over garbage collection (GC) events and the Java virtual 
Machine (JVM). The GC could be invoked at any time and thus potentially displace the 
times during which each instruction is executed. In general, the results presented in 
Chapter 7 correspond to acquisitions running applet test 2 unless otherwise specified.  
The JCOP41 Java Cards process information approximately two times faster than the 
JCOP30 Java Cards. On average it takes 1.43 ms to run applet test 1 and start the reply 
while it takes 3.318 ms to run applet test 2 and respond. The difference between the two 
times (1.888 ms) corresponds to the time required to run 20 cycles of clearing and writing 
the variable V. This means each cycle requires 94.4 µs which is equivalent to 1,280 clock 
periods from the card reader.  
The end of the command sent from the card reader to the smart card with the plaintext 
that the card processes looks the same for the JCOP30 and the JCOP41. Figure 6.4 
illustrates the shape of different plaintexts going from 0x00 on the bottom to 0x0F on the 




redundancy check (CRC) is appended to the end of the communication. This attachment 
makes the end of the command shown in the Figure 6.4 appear different from a 
consecutive binary pattern. According to this standard, the end of the command occurs 
256 clock cycles (18.89 µs) after the transmission of the last bit. This means that the red 
line can be considered the approximated time where the card starts processing the 
information. The start of the response from the JCOP41 is shown in Figure 6.5, where an 
early start of the response for the cases when the card processed the plaintexts 5, 14 and 
15 is visible.  
 



















Figure 6.4: End of command from the card reader to the smart 
card JCOP41 for different plaintexts 
End of command 






In Table 6.1 the processing times for the JCOP30 and JCOP41 are compared when 
they run the applet test 1 and the applet test 2. For JCOP30, the responses of applet test 2 
occur around 4,929.64 µs. In the case of JCOP41, the start of the responses takes place at 
3.299 ms or 3.318 ms. This time depends on the instant the card finishes computing the 
results and is ready to start transmitting the response. Figure 6.5 exemplifies this 
situation. In the figure, the responses associated with the plaintexts 5, 14 and 15 occur 
earlier than the other plaintexts; however, this behaviour is almost arbitrary and we could 
not determine any pattern after analysing 50,000 traces. 
Table 6.1: Processing time for the small testing applet 
Card Program 
Time of end 
command [µs] 




JCOP30 Applet test 1 97.36 1,345 1,247.64 
JCOP30 Applet test 2 97.36 5,027 4,929.64 
JCOP41 Applet test 1 97.36 1,430 1,332.64 
JCOP41 Applet test 2 97.36 3,299 3,201.64 























Figure 6.5: Start of response from the smart card JCOP41 to the 
card reader 
Early start of 
response 





6.5 Trace Acquisition 
The fast frame function from the oscilloscope supports the capture of multiple traces. Each 
acquisition records a specific number of traces over a given time period. The limit for the 
oscilloscope used is 32 M samples (the maximum storage); for example, it is possible to 
acquire 1 trace of 32 M samples or alternatively up to 64,000 traces of 500 samples.  
To capture the signals from the smart cards studied, different sampling rates were used. 
In Chapter 7 sampling rates of 250 and 500 MS/s are reported. For Section 7.1 a sampling 
rate of 250 MS/s, the GMR probe described in Chapter 5, and the JCOP30 running applet 
test 2 were used. Here five sets of 40 µs were obtained to cover the interval from 
1,400 µs to 1,600 µs. Each set contained 39,936 traces captured on 13 acquisitions of 
3,072 traces each. For the test results presented Section 7.2 a sampling rate of 500 MS/s 
using the GMR probe on the JCOP30 running the applet test 2 were used. There were 
5,888 traces captured per acquisition. To capture the interval from 1,400 µs to 1,600 µs it 
was necessary to acquire 20 sets of 10 µs. For the test results presented Section 7.3 a 
sampling rate of 500 MS/s was used as well. The GMR probe and the JCOP41 card 
running the applet test 2 was analyzed. Each acquired trace was divided into smaller files 
of 1.18 µs. Each reduced file contains the data related to 16 clock cycles from the card 
reader. The rationale to have segments of 16 clock cycles was influenced by preliminary 
results for correlation analysis in the frequency domain where a different number of clock 
cycles was used to transform the EM traces from the time domain to the frequency 
domain, namely 8 cycles, the length for better preliminary results.  
6.5.1 The Faraday Cage 
One of the customized modifications made to better understand the possible side channel 
of the smart cards was removing the IC chip from the card and connecting it to the card 
containing the antenna using two wires. The main reason for this was to move the smart 
card microcontroller and the EM probe away from the card reader and its strong EM 
field. Having the IC chip away from the card reader in fact reduces the effects of the card 
reader; however, other signals also affect the measurements and the IC chip was placed 




of the setups used in this research is presented where the IC chip was removed from the 
smart card and placed inside this “Faraday cage”. Inside the box and on top of the IC chip 
the GMR probe can be seen the Altera DE2 board used to implement the triggering 
circuit is located next to the coordinates table. In this experiment, the GMR probe was 
manually placed on top of the IC chip inside of our Faraday cage and 9 different positions 
for each direction in the axis of sensitivity (X and Y) were evaluated. The area 
corresponding to the chip was divided into 9 sections, left, center, and right with respect 
to the X-axis and top, medium, and bottom with respect to the Y-axis. Then the middle 
point between pins 2 and 8 and 1 and 7 was the reference point on the probe and was 
positioned in each of the 9 sections. The position that seems to return the best results was 
with the probe in the top center position. 
 





6.6 Comparison to Previous Research and Summary 
An experimental setup for studying the side channel from Java Smart cards is presented 
in this chapter. First, some modifications made to a commercial card reader to improve 
the quality of the acquired traces are described. An axis table that manually sets the EM 
probe into different positions above the smart card was built. This approach differs from 
other research where the placement of the probes is automatic like described in 
(Quisquater and Samyde, 2001) or completely manual, without a systematic scanning as 
indicated in this research (Mangard, 2003). Other characteristics of the setup consisted of 
replacing the power supply and clock generator from the card reader. Initially the card 
reader was connected to Vcc and GND from a USB port, but the connections were 
modified to bypass the voltage terminals from the USB port and connect a laboratory 
power supply. In the case of the clock generator, it was removed and replaced by a stable 
signal generator. Triggering the oscilloscope from a smartcard working in contactless 
mode is difficult because the cards do not have contact points or external signals that 
could be used to send information to the oscilloscope and the trigger depends on the 
communication channel between the card reader and the card. In (Mangard, 2003), the 
author could not find a trigger for the oscilloscope based on the far field radiated 
emissions and they used a trigger connected physically with the card reader due to the 
impossibility of locating a trigger for the oscilloscope based on the radiated emissions. In 
other analyses where the smart cards worked contactlessly this difficulty was solved by 
using custom and freely programmable RFID readers (Kasper et al. 2009), (Kasper et al. 
2011), (Oswald and Paar, 2011). In this research a commercial card reader was selected 
and a decoder was developed that in parallel to the smart card receives all the commands 
and triggers the oscilloscope when a programmed sequence of commands occur. 
Although in the experimental test, the oscilloscope’s high resolution mode returned 
slightly higher correlation than sampling mode, sampling mode allows capturing double 
the number of traces compared to the high resolution mode. Another element that helped 
in the search of a possible side channel on the Java Cards is removing the IC from the 
card and placing it away from the card reader inside of a metallic box that helps to reduce 




attack on a DESFire by removing the IC chip from the card, but given the unsuccessful 
results using DEMA and the inconvenience of having to examine the reader’s antenna 
signal at every single measurement to obtain the plaintext used, they chose to build a 
custom RFID-reader. With respect to using a Faraday cage, some researchers have 
incorporated this element into their setups. In (Quisquater and Samyde, 2001) a 
customised socket was used to place a contact based smartcard inside of a Faraday cage 
while the card reader was outside. Other research such as (Plos et al. 2008) placed a smart 
card based on the microcontroller ATmega163 and the card reader inside a metallic box 
and they were able to reduce the number of traces required for a successful attack from 
70,000 traces to 17,500 traces.  
The sampling rate used for acquiring power or EM traces can affect the side channel 
analysis outcomes. In Chapter 5, it was illustrated that when using higher sampling 
frequencies, the correlation values increased. In previous research different sampling 
rates have been successfully used in the study of side channel analysis of the smart cards. 
For example, resolutions of 250 MS/s were used to analyse the power samples from an 
8-bit microcontroller (Mangard et al. 2007) and 500 MS/s were used in other research 
(Moradi et al. 2009) (Oswald and Paar, 2011). Other works had opted for higher 
sampling rates like in (Carluccio et al. 2005) (Lu et al. 2009b) where the sampling rate of 
1 GS/s was used to analyse emissions from a smart card and ASICs respectively. 
However, with an oscilloscope’s constrained memory there is a trade-off among sampling 
rate, length of acquisition and the number of traces acquired. In this research, resolutions 
of 250 MS/s and 500 MS/s were considered for the study of the smart cards. The next 





Empirical Analysis of the Java Smart Cards 
A synopsis of the results obtained after analysing the JCOP30 and JCOP41 Java Cards is 
presented in this chapter. It is divided into 3 main sections and a summary. Section 7.1 
presents the results obtained after analysing the EM power traces obtained from the 
JCOP30 smart card when the IC chip was removed from the card; Section 7.2 expounds 
the results obtained after analysing the EM traces captured from the JCOP30 smart card 
without any modifications made to the card itself; and Section 7.3 analyzes the results 
from analysis of the EM traces obtained from the unmodified JCOP41 smart card. In the 
three cases, the analyses considered the EM traces in the interval from 1,400 µs to 
1,600 µs after the trigger. Although many experiments and analyses using different clock 
cycles (6, 8, 12, 16, 24, 30, 32, and 64) were investigated, due to limited space, the results 
presented in this chapter focus on intervals of 8 clock cycles (0.589 µs) at the point where 
the analyses returned the best results. Considering the difficulties of acquiring EM traces 
from the Java Cards that successfully retrieve the correct key using a commercial 
inductive EM probe, a number of alternative probes were tested. Those experiments 
included inductors of different sizes, wire gauges, number of loops, VCR heads for VHS 
tapes, and a probe that uses giant magnetoresistance sensors (Mateos and Gebotys, 2011). 
All the analyses presented in this chapter come from traces acquired using a GMR probe. 
For Section 7.1 the results were verified for keys 0x5C and 0x9E. For Section 7.2 the 
keys 0x03, 0x3D, 0x5C, 0x9E, A2, and 0xE3 were tested. Finally, for Section 7.3 the 
keys 0x03, 0x9E, and 0xA2 were verified. 
7.1 Java Card JCOP30 with Modifications 
In an early stage of this research, EM traces acquired from a JCOP30 Java Card without 
modifications were analysed and those analyses did not succeed in returning the correct 
keys. Different EM probes were used and the card was placed in different positions but 
the results consistently failed in guessing the correct keys. These difficulties motivated a 
modification to the smart card that consisted in removing the IC chip from the card and 
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placing it away from the card reader and its strong magnetic field. With this change and 
using the GMR probe, it was possible to retrieve the correct key used. This section 
describes the results obtained after analyzing the JCOP30 with the IC chip removed from 
the card and placed inside a Faraday cage as explained in Chapter 6, The results 
presented in this section were obtained by analyzing 39,936 traces (13 acquisitions of 
3,072 traces each) acquired with a sampling rate of 250 MS/s using the GMR probe 
without a preamplifier, when 39,936 plaintexts were processed using the hexadecimal 
value 0x5C as the small part of the key, using the JCOP30 running applet test 2. With the 
selection of a lower resolution, 250 MS/s instead of 500 MS/s, it was possible to cover 
the double of time with the same acquisitions. The window of time captured was from 
1,400 µs to 1,600 µs.  
7.1.1 Time Domain Analysis 
As explained in Chapter 3, correlation analysis measures the level of association between 
the EM traces when the studied circuit is processing some cryptographic information and 
the hypothetical power consumption model. The result of this analysis is a matrix where 
the columns correspond to the sampling times and each row corresponds to a possible key 
guess, row 0 corresponds to key guess 0, row 1 to key guess 1, etc. The relevant 
information for this experiment occurs in the interval referred to as 1,498.5 µs to 
1,499.1 µs that corresponds to 8 cycles of the card reader. The sampling rate of 250 MS/s 
corresponds to 146 samples (columns of the correlation matrix). This time region was 
found after several acquisitions and analyses across the interval 1,400 µs and 1,600 µs 
searching for a region were the correlation analysis returned the correct key. Results were 
verified using different keys such as 0x03, 0x3D, 0x5C 0x9E, and 0xE3. 
For the traces studied here, the result from the correlation analysis in the time domain 
is a matrix where row 92 (corresponding to the correct key guess 0x5C) has the highest 
value in the matrix and some of its elements are the largest in their columns. This means 
that the key guess ranked in first place corresponds to the key used to process the data. A 
3D plot from the correlation matrix where the values for the correct key guess are marked 
in black while all other key guesses are represented in a different color from blue to red is 
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presented in Figure 7.1. Key guess 92 has a higher correlation than its neighbours for all 
time samples, but this is not easy to observe in Fig. 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1: Representation of the correlation analysis matrix in the time domain using 
39,936 traces. 
A projection of the correlation matrix showing the time interval from 1,498.5 µs to 
1,499.1 µs is presented in Figure 7.2. In this plot, each color matches a key guess which 
is superimposed on each time sample on this plot. The maximum correlation for each 
time sample belongs to the key guess 92. The magnitude of the maximum correlation 
coefficient is 0.01959 and occurs at 1,498.65 µs. The figure illustrates that the correlation 
of the correct key guess (black circle with star inside it) is bigger than the other higher 
correlation keys at different times. The difference between the maximums of the key 













Figure 7.2: Projection from the correlation analysis matrix in the time domain using 
39,936 traces. 
The projection of the key guess vs. correlation showing the maximum value of the 
correlation matrix for each key guess over the entire time range is illustrated in 
Figure 7.3. The maximum correlation for the correct key guess is 2.98 bigger than the 
mean of all key guesses maximums.  
 
Figure 7.3: Projection of the correlation analysis matrix in the time domain using 39,936 
traces showing the maximum correlations for each small part of the key guess in the 
interval 1,498.5 µs to 1,499.1 µs. 
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Using SPA, the average of all traces according to their Hamming weight is presented in 
Figure 7.4. There are 8 maximum amplitude peaks around 5 mV which are visible. These 
values are related to the clock cycle of the card reader. The figure illustrates zooming into 
one part of the figure around 1,498.65 µs, where the correct key guess reaches its 
maximum correlation. The sequence of the Hamming weights measured at this point is 0, 
1, 6, 3, 5, 4, 2, 7, and 8. The values 6, 5, and 2 are misplaced. According to the values 
shown in the figure, the difference in the voltage measured between the traces 
corresponding to the Hamming weights HW=7 and HW=8, is 175 µV while the 
difference measured for HW=0 and HW=1 is approximately 10 µV. Table 7.1 shows the 
distribution of the Hamming weights according to the number of traces used. The next 
section examines the frequency domain analysis. 
Table 7.1: Distribution of the 39,936 traces used according to their Hamming weight 
HW # of traces Percentage 
0 156 0.39 
1 1,248 3.13 
2 4,368 10.94 
3 8,736 21.88 
4 10,920 27.34 
5 8,736 21.88 
6 4,368 10.94 
7 1,248 3.13 







Figure 7.4: Hamming weight of the acquisition traces at the maximum correlation.  
On top the interval 1,498.5 µs to 1,499.1 µs and in the bottom a zoom to the interval 
1,489.5 µs to 1,498.8 µs. 




















Hamming Weight(HW) at the attack time (JCOP30)
 HW=01 234567
 HW=8






























7.1.2 Frequency Domain Analysis 
Correlation analysis in the frequency domain measures the grade of similarity between 
the hypothetical power consumption model and the power spectrum from the measured 
signals. The result is a correlation matrix where the rows are related to the hypothetical 
key guesses and the columns to each one of the frequencies from the power spectrum 
signal. The traces analyzed in this section are the same traces that were studied in 
Section 7.1.1. These traces were transformed into the frequency domain using the FFT. 
The sampling rate of the setup used was 250 MS/s and the range of frequencies went 
from DC to 125 MHz. Refer to Chapter 2 for more details on the procedure to obtain the 
correlation matrix.  
The maximum value in the correlation matrix obtained from the analysis in the 
frequency domain is in row 92 corresponding to the correct key guess 0x5C and the 
column associated with the frequency of 112.85 MHz. In Figure 7.5, the correlation 
matrix is represented, with one axis representing the 256 possible key guesses and in 
the other axis the frequencies from DC to 125 MHz. The correlation values for the 
correct key are highlighted in black while the values for each other key are in colors 




Figure 7.5: Representation of the correlation analysis matrix in the frequency domain 
using 39,936 traces. 
The superimposed correlation matrix showing the frequency and correlation axis is 
illustrated in Figure 7.6. The color of traces corresponds to each key guess used while the 
black trace with a star shape corresponds to the correct small part of the key used. In this 
case, the maximum correlation for the correct key guess occurs at 112.85 MHz. It is also 
clearly observed that at 12.15 MHz, the correlation for the correct key is higher than the 













Figure 7.6: Projection from the correlation analysis matrix in the frequency domain  
using 39,936 traces. 
The projection of the key guess vs. correlation is shown in Figure 7.7. The correlation 
for the correct key (r=0.02565) is higher than any other key guess. The second maximum 
correlation corresponds to the key guess 146 and it is 3.15% smaller than the first. In the 
case of the maximum correlation, it is 3.2924 standard deviations bigger than the mean of 
all other maximums. 
 
Figure 7.7: Projection of the correlation analysis matrix in the frequency domain using 
39,936 traces showing the maximum correlations for each small part of the key guess in 
the interval 1,498.5 µs to 1,499.1 µs. 

































Figure 7.8: Hamming weight analysis in the frequency domain. 
Using SPA, the means of all FFTs from the traces for each Hamming weight are 
presented in the Figure 7.8. In the upper side of the figure some picks are visible at 
13.56 MHz, 27.12 MHz, and the highest of all at 40.68 MHz. The bottom part of the 
figure zooms in on two frequencies 12.15 MHz and 112.85 MHz. At both frequencies, it 
is observable that the EM power measured from the circuit has a slight resemblance to 
the expected power consumption where the average of each Hamming weight has a 
sequentially increasing/decreasing value. In the measured signals, the sequence is 0, 1, 2, 
3, 5, 4, 6, 7, and 8. The misplacement of HW=4 and the use of logarithmic scale 
contributes to a correlation of around 0.025 for 112.85 MHz and 0.016 at 12.15 MHz. 
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Another important detail in this graph is the magnitude of the power measured. Considering 
that -80 dB corresponds to 10 nW and -80.2 dB to 9.54 nW, it is possible to infer from the 
graphs that the difference in measured power consumption when no bits change (HW=0) 
and when one bit changes (HW=1) is approximately 450 pW at 112.8 MHz. 
7.2 Java Card JCOP30 without Modifications 
This section presents the results obtained after analyzing the JCOP30 smart card without 
modifications in the time and frequency domain. For this analysis 5,888 traces were 
captured in a single acquisition with a sample rate of 500 MS/s using a GMR probe and a 
wideband amplifier when the smart card runs the applet test 2. These traces were 
captured later than those in the previous section, and due to time limits imposed on this 
research, a larger set of traces was not possible. In this setup, no Faraday cage was used. 
The results presented correspond to the key=0xA2 (162d) and were verified for other 
keys (0x03, 0x3D, 0x5C, 0x9E, and 0xE3) with similar results. The traces acquired and 
analysed for this experimental setup included 20 sets of 5,888 traces over 10 µs intervals 
that cover from 1,400 µs to 1,600 µs. The relevant information from the analysis occurs 
in the time between 1,498.5 µs and 1,499.1 µs corresponding to 8 cycles of the card 
reader clock. The axis table described in Chapter 6 was used to position the GMR probe. 
In Chapter 5, the reference point to position the GMR probe was discussed a the point 
between the pins 1, 2, 7, and 8 from its MSOP8 package. This point was positioned on 
the top center position corresponding to the area of the IC as shown before in Figure 6.3.  
7.2.1 Time Domain Analysis 
The result of correlation analysis in the time domain for this setup is a correlation matrix 
with 256 rows (associated to the key guesses) and 294 columns associated with the 
1,498.5 µs to 1,499.1 µs interval. The values of this correlation matrix are illustrated in 
Figure 7.9. It indicates that the maximum correlation among the key guesses corresponds 
with the correct key used. In the figure, each color trace corresponds to the correlation 
values of a particular key guess and the correct key=162 (0xA2) is colored black with a 




Figure 7.9: 3-D representation of the correlation analysis matrix in the time domain for the 
JCOP30 smartcard without modifications. 
The correlation matrix has a number of values close to 0.05 and the 3D perspective 
affects the perception of the results. To compare these values, Figure 7.10 provides a 
projection of the correlation values across the time axis. In the plot, each color 
corresponds to one of the key guesses. The correlation values corresponding to the 
correct small part of the key (0xA2=162) are highlighted using a black trace with a star. 
At some points it is visible that the correlation values for the correct key are bigger than 
other key guesses. The maximum correlation is 0.05407 and it occurs at 1,498.92 µs. The 




Figure 7.10: Projection of the correlation matrix for the time domain analysis using 5,888 
traces showing the correlation values vs. time. 
A graph containing the maximum correlations for each of the key guesses over the 
entire time interval is shown in Figure 7.11. In this case, the maximum value for the 
correct key is 3.27 standard deviations bigger than the mean of all key guess maximums. 




































Figure 7.11: Projection of the correlation matrix for the time domain analysis using 5,888 
traces. 
In the case of the other keys tested, the correlation magnitudes were similar to the ones 
obtained for key 0xA2 and they are presented in Table 7.2. Although the correct key was 
not guessed in all cases, it was returned among the first 12 ranks. 








0x03 1,492.48 2 0.0544 
0x3D 1,496.02 3 0.0502 
0x9E 1,497.88 1 0.0529 
0xA2 1,498.92 1 0.0540 
0x5C 1,493.73 5 0.0534 




The average of the 5,888 traces according to their Hamming weight using the power 
model for the correct key guess and a sampling rate of 500 MS/s is plotted in Figure 7.12. 
In the graph, the 8 clock cycles with the highest voltage in each period above 50 mV are 
distinguishable. The bottom part of the figure shows the time where the correlation 
analysis returned the maximum correlation (0.05407 at 1,498.928 µs). At this point the 
order of the Hamming weights from bottom to top is 8, 0, 2, 1, 3, 6, 4, 5 and 7. 
Apparently, the average Hamming weights that are out of sequence are 8, 2 and 6, but the 
ones corresponding to 0, 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 are in the correct order and those represent the 
77.7% of the traces used. With this setup the difference calculated between HW=0 and 
HW=1 is 164 µV. Table 7.3 shows the distribution of the Hamming weights according to 
the number of traces used; here the plaintexts were repeated 23 times from 0x00 to 0xFF.  
Table 7.3: Distribution of the 5,888 traces used according to their Hamming weight 
HW # of traces Percentage 
0 23 0.39 
1 184 3.13 
2 644 10.94 
3 1,288 21.88 
4 1,610 27.34 
5 1,288 21.88 
6 644 10.94 
7 184 3.13 







Figure 7.12: Average of 5,888 traces according to its Hamming weight using the power 
model for the correct key guess and a sampling rate of 500 MS/s. 
7.2.2 Frequency Domain Analysis 
The EM traces analysed in this section are the same signals studied in the previous 
Section 7.2.1 from times 1,498.5 µs to 1,499 µs but mapped into the frequency domain 
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using the FFT. According to the sampling rate of 500 MS/s, the columns from the 
correlation matrix are associated with frequencies from DC to 250 MHz. After analysing 
the traces in the frequency domain, the resulting correlation matrix is represented in 
Figure 7.13. Its maximum correlation value (0.07) appears in row 162 corresponding to 
the key guess (0xA2) and is highlighted in black. This appears at a frequency of 
170 MHz. 
 
Figure 7.13: 3 D representation of the correlation matrix in the frequency domain using 
5,888 EM traces. 
A projection of the correlation matrix showing the frequency and correlation axis is 
presented in Figure 7.14. The maximum value from the matrix is 0.07016 which 
identifies the correct key and appears at a frequency corresponding with 170 MHz. The 
second maximum correlation corresponds with the key guess 249 (0xF9) at 54.4 MHz. In 
this case, the difference between first and second place is 9.79%, the magnitude of the 
maximum value. Analysing only the magnitudes from all key guesses at a frequency of 




Figure 7.14: 2-D projection from the max correlation per frequency after using 5,888 EM 
traces. 
The max correlations over all frequencies corresponding to each key guess are 
presented in Figure 7.15. For this set of values, the distance between the maximum value 
of the correct key and the average of all maximums is 3.73 standard deviations.  
 
Figure 7.15: Projection of the Max correlations over all frequencies for the JCOP30 
using 5,888 traces. 









































The analysis in the frequency domain for other keys showed smaller spikes than key 
0xA2. Table 7.4 shows a synthesis of these results at the times where the correlation 
analysis, in the time domain returned the best results. Similar to the time domain 
analysis the correct key was not returned in all cases but in this case it was ranked 
among the first 5. 








0x03 23 3 0.0610 
0x3D 124 1 0.0644 
0x9E 168 5 0.0592 
0xA2 170 1 0.0701 
0x5C 23 2 0.0603 
0xE3 52 3 0.0615 
 
 
The mean of all traces that share the same Hamming weight based on the hypothetical 
power model using the correct key guess are displayed in Figure 7.16. In the top part, the 
power spectrum of the signals is shown and a number of peaks on the multiples of the 
13.56 MHz clock frequency (27.12 MHz, 40.68 MHz, 54.24 MHz, etc) are visible. In the 
bottom part, the area around the two frequencies, 170 MHz and 3.4 MHz where the 
correlation for the correct key was bigger than the other key guesses, is magnified. At 
170 MHz the sequence of the Hamming weights is 1, 0, 8, 3, 2, 4, 7, 5, and 6; in this case 
1, 8, 2, and 7 are misplaced. For the frequency of 3.4 MHz the Hamming weight 
sequence from bottom to top is 8, 0, 1, 3, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7. The Hamming weights that 





Figure 7.16: Power spectrum averages according to their Hamming weights. 
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7.2.3 Measuring the Effectiveness of the Analysis in the Time and 
Frequency Domain  
In Chapter 3, two metrics were introduced to measure the effectiveness of an attack: 
accuracy and estimation. Accuracy uses the correct key information and the correlation 
matrix to quantify how close the key guess was to the correct guess. Defined in Equation 
(3-12), it is an exponential scale that uses powers of 2 to evaluate the results of a given 
analysis and helps to compare different attacks by quantifying the effectiveness of each 
attack. If the small part of the key is 1 byte long then when a key guess is ranked in first 
place, the accuracy is 1, if it is ranked in second place, the accuracy is 0.5, etc. In the case 
of estimation, it analyses the dispersion of the maximum correlations for the key guesses 
and when the magnitude of the maximum correlation is δ standard deviations bigger than 
the mean of all maximums the estimation will be 1 and in any other case, it is 0. This 
latter metric does not require any knowledge of the correct key. 
Next, the results for correlation analysis in the time domain, frequency domain, and 
fast correlation analysis are compared using accuracy as a metric. In Figure 7.17 the 
results obtained by running the 3 respective analyses starting with one trace and adding 
traces until reaching 5,888 using a linear scale (left) are presented. The figure shows that 
using correlation analysis in the frequency domain it is possible to find the correct small 
part of the key guess with 386 traces and the result remains for up to 495 traces. Adding 
more traces to the analysis, the accuracy moves back to values lower than 0.001 to later 
come back to an accuracy of 1 using 3,596 traces. Reviewing the results for the frequency 
domain analysis, it was found that the frequency that returned the highest correlation 
from 386 traces to 495 traces was 25.5 MHz, while after 3,596 traces, it is 170 MHz.  
For the case of correlation analysis in the time domain, the analysis reaches an 
accuracy of 1 with 4,155 traces and remains there before 4,180 traces. Then, there are 
some variations between 0.5 and 0.125 and after 5,000 traces it moves to one thousandth. 
With more than 5,526 traces, the accuracy moves to values between 0.25 and 1 (though 
most of the time it is at 1). Additionally, using Equation (3-11) and considering 5,888 
traces, the noise floor is 0.0521. According to (Mangard, 2004), setting an α=0.9 in 
Equation (3-10) provides a reasonable value for calculating the lower bound of the 
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number of traces necessary for an attack. Using 5,888 traces, α=0.9 (zα=1.282) (Mangard 
et al. 2007), and applying Equation (3-10), the result is a correlation of ρ=0.0236 and for 
α=0.995 (zα=2.576), it is ρ=0.0475. The maximum correlation value r found 
experimentally (0.0547) is bigger than ρα=0.9 and ρ α=0.995. This means that the attack in the 
time domain should be considered meaningful. 
For the case of fast correlation in the frequency domain, only the component of 
170 MHz was considered. In Figure 7.17 with the semi-log scale, the accuracy starts very 
small reaching its minimum 9.056×10
-72
 with 191 traces from there it starts rising with a 
few fluctuations and with 766 traces it reaches the accuracy of 1. It keeps fluctuating 
between 0.0039 and 1 and finally become stable at 1 after 2,437 traces. In the case where 
the correct key would be unknown, using estimation and a factor δ=4.6, 3,629 traces 
would be required to guess the correct key. 
  
Figure 7.17: Comparison of 3 types of correlation analysis using accuracy as metric linear 
scale (left) and semi-log scale (right). 
 
7.3  Java Card JCOP41 Without Modifications 
In this part of the dissertation, the results obtained from the analysis of the JCOP41 
when 5,888 EM power traces are acquired using the GMR probe are illustrated. The 
sampling rate used is 500 MS/s and the time reported corresponds to the 8 clock cycles 
between 1,535.8 µs and 1,536.4 µs. This interval returned the highest magnitudes for 
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correlation analysis in the frequency domain. The hexadecimal value used as the small 
part of the key was 0x03. For this experiment the GMR probe and the wideband 
amplifier were used.  
7.3.1 JCOP41 Time 
Unlike the results of the previous two sections, it was not possible to find the correct key 
guess using correlation analysis in the time domain. A 3D representation of the 
correlation matrix is displayed in Figure 7.18. The key used for processing the data is 
highlighted in black with a circle on top. In the figure, there are other key guesses that 
have higher correlation values than the maximum for the correct key used. 
 
Figure 7.18: Representation of the correlation matrix in the time domain using 5,888 
traces. 
A projection of the correlation matrix from the time domain analysis is shown in 
Figure 7.19. The correct key is displayed in black with a star on it; however, there are a 
few points where the key guess overcomes the other values. At 1,536.1 µs with a 
correlation of 0.04266, the maximum value for the correct key guess appears. The 












guess (234) and it is 4.23 standard deviations bigger than the average of the highest 
values for all key guesses. 
 
Figure 7.19: Projection from the correlation analysis matrix in the time domain showing 
correlation vs. time, using 5,888 traces. 
The difference between the correlation of key guess 234 and key guess 45 ranked in 
second place is 4.81%. Figure 7.20 shows the highest correlation values obtained in the 
correlation matrix for each key guess. The other keys tested (0x9E and 0xA2) using the 
JCOP41 were unsuccessful in recovering the correct key. 































Figure 7.20: Projection of the correlation matrix in the time domain showing 
correlation vs. key guess using 5,888 traces. 
Using SPA and considering as a reference the hypothetical power consumption model 
from the correct key used for processing the plaintexts, the average of the EM traces 
sorted according to their Hamming weight is displayed in Figure 7.21. In the upper part 
of the figure, the 8 clock cycles processed are displayed and in the bottom part, the figure 
zooms in on 1,536.07 µs, the time where the correct key used presented its maximum 
correlation value. At this point, the sequence of the Hamming weights from top to bottom 
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Figure 7.21 Averages of the EM traces according to the Hamming 
weight of the correct key guess power model. 
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7.3.2 Frequency Domain Analysis Using the JCOP41 
For the frequency domain analysis, the EM traces used in Section 7.3.1 are transformed 
into the frequency domain using the FFT. The correlation matrix values obtained after 
analysing the corresponding 5,888 power spectrum traces are represented in Figure 7.22. 
The values corresponding to the correct key guess (0x03) are displayed in black with 
circles on top. 
 
Figure 7.22: Representation of the correlation matrix in the frequency domain using 5,888 
traces. 
A projection of the correlation matrix across the different frequencies is shown in 
Figure 7.23. The maximum value 0.06627 occurs at 116.44 MHz and the maximum value 
is 5.31 standard deviations bigger than the mean of the other correlations at that particular 
frequency. The difference between the first and second biggest correlation (key guess 













Figure 7.23: Projection of the correlation matrix after using 5,888 traces. 
The highest correlations for each key guess are represented in Figure 7.24. In the graph 
the correct key displayed in black is 3.58 standard deviations bigger than the average of 
all other maximums for the correct key. 

































Figure 7.24: Projection of the correlation analysis matrix for the JCOP41 using correlation 
analysis in the frequency domain and 5,888 power spectrum traces. 
The average of all power spectrums according to their Hamming weight using the 
hypothetical power models with the correct key are displayed in Figure 7.25. In the upper 
part of the figure, the average power spectrum corresponding to each Hamming weight is 
represented. The frequencies related to the harmonics of the card reader clock frequency 
(13.56 MHz) reaching the maximum power at 41 MHz are visible with higher 
magnitudes. The figure zooms in on the 116.44 MHz frequency, This is the point where 
the correlation matrix returned the greatest value. In the case of the other key guesses 
tested, the results are presented in Table 7.5. 








0x03 116 1 0.0662 
0x9E 68 7 0.0402 
0xA2 116 2 0.0468 
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The sequence of Hamming weights from smallest to largest at this point is 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 
6, 5, 7, and 8. The only value that looks out of sequence is HW=6. Converting the values 
from dB to watts at 116.44 MHz, the difference in the power measured using the GMR 




Figure 7.25: Average Hamming weight using the hypothetical power model of the correct 
key. 
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7.3.3 Measuring the Effectiveness of the Analysis in the Time and 
Frequency Domain  
The performance of correlation analysis in the time and frequency domain are compared 
by contrasting the accuracy results obtained for different number of traces using each 
technique. The accuracy results obtained after analysing 1 to 5,888 EM traces and their 
corresponding power spectrum traces are displayed in Figure 7.26, where it is visible that 
the time domain analysis, represented by a blue dashed line, did not returned the correct 
key (up to 5,888 traces analysed), while for the frequency domain analysis with 5,101 
traces, it was possible to recover the correct key. The result of adding more traces are 
visible in the upper part of the graph where a linear scale was used. These variations do 
not go below 0.0078 and after 5,501 traces, the minimum is 0.125 but it returns to 1. 
 
Figure 7.26: Contrast between time and frequency domain analysis using accuracy as 
the metric (JCOP41). 
7.4 Comparison to Previous Research and Summary  
Unlike previous research where the attacks on Java Cards have used power analysis 
(Vermoen et al. 2007, Sterckx, 2009), in this research EM analysis is used. In a recent 
attack on contactless smart cards published by (Oswald and Paar, 2011), DESFire 
cards, a different type of card from the Java Cards analyzed in this research, were used. 
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The DESFire cards do not have garbage collection and the previously published attacks 
are on a hardware implementation. In this research, the Java Cards have garbage 
collection and the AES software implementations under analysis or attack require 
significantly longer execution times. 
In this chapter, the three illustrative cases where correlation analysis is used to analyse 
the EM power traces captured on two types of Java Cards are presented.  
In the first case, the card used was the JCOP30 where the IC chip was removed from 
the card and placed inside a Faraday cage. The number of traces analysed are 39,936 with 
a sampling rate of 250 MS/s. Using correlation analysis in the time domain and frequency 
domain, it was possible to determine the small part of the key used when the card runs a 
software implementation of AES.  
In the second case studied, the card is the JCOP30 without modifications and the 
analysis uses 5,888 EM traces, acquired with a sampling resolution of 500 MS/s. For 
these traces, both forms of analysis (in time and frequency domains) were able to return 
the correct key. It is clear in Figure 7.17 that the tendency of the correct key is well 
defined in returning an accuracy of 1.  
The third case presented, corresponds to a JCOP41 card without modifications. For this 
analysis, 5,888 traces were acquired with a sampling rate of 500 MS/s. Using correlation 
analysis in the frequency domain, it was possible to recover the correct small part of the 
key. An incorrect key was returned using correlation analysis in the time domain. 
A summary of the results from this chapter is presented in Table 7.6. For the three 
cases studied, the analysis in the frequency domain returned higher correlations than the 
time domain. An element to consider in the analysis, beside the magnitude of the 
correlation, is the distance  measured between the highest correlation value from correct 
key guess and the average of all maximums for the other key guesses. These distances are 
bigger in the case of the frequency domain analysis. To illustrate the meaning of these 
distances, let us say that if the values of the maximum correlation for all guesses were 
normally distributed, only 1 of 256 values is expected to be farther than Δ=2.886 standard 
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deviations above the mean; 1 of 370 is expected to be farther than Δ=3, and 1 of 5,222 is 
expected to be farther than Δ=3.73. 
Table 7.6: Summary of results for the correlation analysis presented. 





Time domain Frequency domain 
Maximum 
Correlation 
for the  









































unable to recover the correct key with 5,888 traces. 
The correlation results presented in this chapter maybe do not show the “high” spikes 
reported in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. However, with the exception of the analysis to the 
JCOP41 in the time domain, the results are above the noise floor calculated with 
Equation (3-12) which is 0.02 for 39,936 traces and 0.0521 for 5,888 traces. Moreover, 
the maximum correlations found are bigger than those estimated for distinguishing a peak 
using Equation (3-11) with an error probability α=0.995 and the respective number of 





Discussions and Conclusions 
Studying the Java Cards working in contactless mode required the analysis of complex 
EM emissions from a system on chip (SoC) device in the presence of a strong external 
EM field generated by the card reader. This challenge motivated research in experimental 
setup and sophisticated signal analysis. A number of features in the final setup were 
unique to the contactless cards, such as removing the card reader from its box and placing 
it in a coordinates table where the position of the card and EM sensors can be easily 
adjusted. Other adjustments like the replacement of the power supply to reduce the noise 
on the acquired signal and the change from an inductive probe to a GMR probe as 
described in Chapter 5 are critical for the successful analysis. Besides the quality of the 
EM acquisitions, the long time interval acquired for the study of Java Cards is another 
challenge. In the case of the attack on the microcontroller (Chapter 3), the time of the 
attack after the trigger is 7.35 µs and in the DPA contest (Chapter 4), the 10 rounds of 
AES take 0.65 µs. For the Java Card the 10 rounds of AES take 3 seconds and the points 
of the attack that are reported in this work occur around 1500 µs after the trigger. 
Additionally, the Java Cards contain a garbage collection utility that may interrupt the 
execution of the program at any time causing further large misalignments as described in 
Section 6.1.3. 
Although calculating a correlation is based on simple mathematical principles, part of 
the complexity of the side channel resides in the magnitude of the sets to associate, and 
the challenges to acquire analyzable data. An alternate approach could attempt to acquire 
“many” power or EM traces during the time the system is encrypting or decrypting the 
data. Quantifying the value of “many” is not trivial and may require an iterative process 
to gain better knowledge about the system under study. Before this research, the number 
of traces required to test or attack a software implementation of AES running on Java 
Cards was unknown. It takes around 3 seconds to complete a full encryption of AES 128 
using a Java software implementation on a JCOP30. Using a sampling rate of 500 MS/s 
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each trace would contain 1,500,000,000 samples. If the number of traces to analyse were 
set to 40,000 traces, it becomes a computational challenge to correlate one matrix of size 
[40,000×1,500,000,000] corresponding to the power EM traces with another of 
[40,000×256] corresponding to the power model (40,000 plaintexts assuming 256 small 
parts of the key). The size of the power traces matrix, assuming 2 bytes per sample, 
would be 120 Tbytes and the analysis in the time domain would require correlating 384 
billion vectors of size 40,000. This research determined the time when the smart card is 
processing one of the S-boxes in the JCOP30 and JCOP41. Then, with less than 5,888 
traces the small parts of the key used for encrypting information using the Java Card were 
retrieved using correlation analysis. 
The analysis of three different experimental setups using Java Cards and the applet test 
2 are presented in Chapter 7. Two of them involve a JCOP30 and one uses the JCOP41; 
in the first case, the IC was removed from the card and placed 30 cm away from the card 
reader inside a Faraday cage; in the other two cases, the Java Cards were analyzed 
without any modification. In the first case, reducing the intensity of the card reader by 
acquiring the EM signals away from it and having a sampling rate of 250 MS/s helped to 
identify a possible time of attack by analyzing longer time intervals without using higher 
resolutions. The other two Java Card analyses used a 500 MS/s sampling rate. Although 
the analysis for the Java Cards did not return those high spikes reported in the 
microcontroller analysis (Chapters 3 and 5), the use of correlation analysis in the 
frequency domain allowed one to recover the correct small part of the key in the three 
cases. Additionally, correlation analysis in the time domain was successful in recovering 
the correct key for the two setups that used the JCOP30; however, analyzing the JCOP41 
in the time domain failed to recover the correct key guess considering up to 5,888 traces.  
Comparing the presented analyses among the Java Card set-ups, the analyses in the 
frequency domain returned better results than correlation analysis in the time domain. 
The analyses of JCOP30 without modifications using 5,888 traces and a sampling rate of 
500 MS/s returned higher correlations and bigger distances between the maximum 
correlation and the mean from all maximums than the other two setups analyzed 
(JCOP30 Faraday cage and JCOP41). The results for the JCOP30 using correlation 
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analysis in the frequency domain returned a maximum correlation r=0.07016. It was 
9.79% bigger than the second highest correlation and 3.73 standard deviations bigger 
than the mean of all maximums. Using correlation analysis in the time domain, the 
maximum correlation was r=0.05407, only 2.5% bigger than the second highest key 
guess and the distance to the mean of all maximums was 3.27 standard deviations. The 
analysis of the JCOP30 where the chip was removed from the card also returned the 
correct key guess but the use of a lower resolution (250 MS/s) seems to have affected the 
outcome, because the distance between the maximum correlation and the average of all 
means was smaller than in the case where 500 MS/s were used. The analysis of the 
JCOP41 in the frequency domain was successful in returning the correct key, although 
the maximum correlation was smaller than for JCOP30. The time domain analysis 
reached a maximum correlation for the correct key guess of 0.04266, 1.9 standard 
deviations above the mean of all maximums for all keys.  
This research has highlighted the importance that a few frequencies are more prone to 
leak information about the secret data processed. A methodology called fast correlation in 
the frequency domain, described in Chapter 2, analyzes a selected range of frequencies 
from the power spectrum and correlates them with the hypothetical power model. This 
type of analysis has been used successfully in retrieving the correct key guess in different 
systems such as microcontrollers (Chapters 3 and 5), FPGAs (Chapter 4), and Java Cards 
(Chapter 7). This analysis also helps to return the correct key guess in the presence of 
small misalignments on the order of 20 ns (Chapter 3). Using fast correlation analysis in 
the frequency domain, approximately 40 EM power traces were needed from the 
microcontroller to recover the correct key guess. In the case of the power traces from the 
DPACv2 public database (key 31), around 5,000 traces were required to recover the 
whole 128 bits of the cipher key and for the JCOP30 without modifications 2,437 traces 
were needed.  
The use of a reduced range of frequencies not only helps to speed up the processing 
time but also seems to require a fewer number of traces as shown in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 7. An important concern with this method is the selection of the leaking 
frequencies. Some ways to select these frequencies have been presented in 
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(Mateos and Gebotys, 2010). The use of a reduced number of frequencies for performing 
differential frequency analysis was applied in (Lu et al. 2009a). More recently in (Oswald 
and Paar, 2011), a selected range of frequencies was used for studying the security of the 
DESFire smart cards using correlation analysis; however, in this case the authors use 
custom hardware real-time filters to acquire the EM traces and later, they analysed those 
acquisitions in the time and frequency domain. 
The difficulties of acquiring EM traces from the Java Cards that successfully retrieve 
the correct key using a commercial inductive EM probe motivated a search for 
alternative probes. After, unsuccessfully testing several probes that included inductors 
of different sizes, wire gauges, number of loops, even VCR heads for VHS tapes, a 
probe that uses giant magnetoresistance sensors was proposed (Mateos and Gebotys, 
2011). This probe has shown to be reliable and significantly helped to investigate the 
side channel. First, it was used to acquire EM traces that allowed retrieving the correct 
key guess from a microcontroller (Chapter 5) and later from the JCOP30 and JCOP41 
Java Cards (Chapter 7). 
As previously discussed, having to analyse traces acquired using different EM probes, 
at different positions, at different sampling rates, with a variety of cipher keys, and over a 
very large analysis time window requires extensive computational processing time. To 
overcome this issue, a number of programs that run correlation analysis in the time and in 
the frequency domain with optimised execution time were developed. One version of 
these programs based on fast correlation in the frequency domain was submitted to the 
DPACv2, since one of the evaluation criteria was the execution time. The results from the 
DPACv2 indicate that this proposed attack was the fastest attack and among the fastest 
attacks it is the one that had the best success rate at 20,000 traces (Chapter 4).  
Similar to the DPA contest where different attacks are compared, side channel research 
needs to evaluate the effectiveness of different attacks and/or data. Usually obtaining the 
correct key is a good gauge, but having the certainty that the results are robust is even 
better. In this research two metrics, accuracy and estimation are presented. Accuracy 
quantifies the correctness of an attack by sorting all the key guesses from more likely to 
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less likely and using an exponential scale to assign a value depending on how close the 
attack is from reaching the correct key guess. For example, an attack that recovers the 
correct key is evaluated two times better than one which returns the correct key in 
second place and four times better than another one that returns the correct key in third 
place. This exponential scale helps to minimise the weight of those attacks that did not 
return the correct key among the top positions. This scale requires one to know the 
correct key to evaluate the performance of the attack. However, when the attacker does 
not know the correct key beforehand, estimation can be used to evaluate the outcome 
from a correlation attack. This metric qualifies the dispersion between the maximum 
value for the correlation and the mean for all maximums. If the distance is bigger than δ 
standard deviations, the attack is considered meaningful, otherwise, it is not. These two 
metrics have been used to evaluate the effectiveness of the different attacks presented 
in this research. 
There are no previous reports of EM side channel attacks on Java Cards working 
contactlessly, apart from an attack on a DESFire card (Oswald and Paar, 2011). Table 8.1 
presents a summary of the characteristics of both works. However, it is important to 
highlight that the subjects of study are different, specifically cards with different types of 
algorithm implementations executing on different hardware (processor vs custom 
hardware) and different numbers of traces considered in the analysis.  
The proposed attacks have successfully returned the correct small part of the key used 
by a software implementation of AES. Although, the experiment is unrealistic in that the 
same value is written multiple times into memory, it provided a good method for 
identifying the attack region. This supported analysis of leakage that could be exploited 
by an attacker.  
In the first experiment reported in Chapter 7, a total of 39,936 traces were used and the 
IC chip was removed from the card to identify a possible time of attack. Once the time of 
the attack was known, it was possible to move forward and in the following experiment 
an unmodified card was used with acquisitions of fewer traces. In this case the 5,888 
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traces were the maximum number of traces that one could acquire with the oscilloscope 
using a sampling rate of 500 MS/s and a window time of 10 µs.  
Table 8.1: Characteristics of the analysis studies to the Java Card and the DESFire Card. 
Characteristic: 
Side Channel Analysis of a 
Java-based Contactless 
Smart Card 
(Oswald and Paar, 2011) 
Type of card Java Card  DESfire  
Model of card JCOP30 and JCOP41 MF3ICD40 








Average running time of 
the cryptographic algorithm 
3 s 8.2 µs  
EM probe used GMR Inductive probe 
Additional hardware used 




Methodology of attack 
used 
Correlation analysis time 
and frequency domain 
Correlation analysis time 
and frequency domain 
Sampling rate 500 MS/s 500 MS/s 
Window of time used in the 
analysis or 
Duration of 1 EM trace  
20 acquisitions of 10 µs 
(200 µs). For frequency 
domain were analyzed 
windows of 0.589 µs 
1.5 µs 
Correlation at the point of 
attack (time domain) 
0.054 at 5,888 traces 
(JCOP30) 
0.042 at 5,888 traces 
(JCOP41) 
0.014 at 500,000 traces 
Correlation at the point of 
attack (frequency domain) 
0.070 at 5,888 traces 
(JCOP30) 
0.066 at 5,888 traces 
(JCOP41) 
0.02 at 500,000 traces 
 
In the case of the smart cards used, little information is available and this makes it 
difficult to know the status of registers and buses in a given time. The writing of a value 
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of 0 to a register before the attacked value allows one to apply the Hamming weight 
model instead of the Hamming distance, whereas explained in Chapters 3 and 6 an 
attacker generally needs to know the previous state of the register or bus under study. The 
proximity to the card reader and its strong magnetic field is another constraint because it 
reduces the signal to noise ratio (SNR). Besides, any effect that the strong EM field could 
induce on the emissions from the smart cards, from acquiring EM traces closer to the card 
reader, usually requires bigger voltage scales in the oscilloscope. The use of higher scales 
implies bigger quantization noise and lower SNR (Johns and Martin, 1997). Considering 
that for correlation analysis the correlation factor ρ and SNR (for small SNRs) are related 
by        (Mangard et al. 2007), a reduction in the SNR implies smaller correlation 
values. Additionally, the SNR is inversely proportional to the number of traces n required 
to identify the correct key   
 
   
  (Mangard et al. 2007). Consequently, one may 
assume that working closer to the card reader will negatively affect the SNR and one 
shall expect a reduction in the correlation magnitudes and an increase in the number of 




8.1 Summary of Contributions 
In this thesis, a complete methodology for analysing the side channel from Java Cards 
while executing a cryptographic algorithm in software in contactless mode is presented. 
The analyses described can be applied, with the corresponding adjustments, to other types 
of smart cards and electronic devices that use cryptographic algorithms. The main 
contributions presented in this work are listed next. 
 The first EM side channel attack of a commercial smart card JCOP30 and 
JCOP41 running in contactless mode and executing a software implementation 
of part of AES 
 The fastest processing time per trace attack, submitted to the DPA contest 
version 2. 
 First application of GMR sensors to side channel attacks.  
 A new type of side channel attack, called fast correlation in the frequency 
domain. 
 Two new metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of the side channel analysis.  
 A complete methodology for the side channel analysis of the smart cards. 
 A novel setup for Java Card analysis that includes a co-ordinates analysis table 
and a programmable instruction based trigger, for the oscilloscope. 
8.2 Future Work 
With the results obtained in this research, new experiments and potential research paths 
arise; some of them are listed in this section. The only impractical aspect of the proposed 
attack is the fact that 20 writes of the AES state were inserted into the partial AES 
application running on the smart card. Hence, it would be interesting in the future to 
attempt to remove this constraint. In particular, future research could study further the 
practicality of this attack by reducing the number of writes to the register and at the same 
time increasing the number of traces. 
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Side channel attacks on the S-boxes of different Java Cards running a software 
implementation of AES were presented in Chapter 7. It would also be suitable to test this 
methodology with a card that runs a hardware implementation of AES.  
The EM traces acquired to analyze the Java Cards were acquired using the GMR probe 
without additional filters or analog demodulators. It would be interesting to study the 
effects of such hardware on the analyses presented here. 
Some constraints from the actual oscilloscope were mentioned in Chapter 6. It would 
be convenient to evaluate the performance of other oscilloscopes or analog to digital 
converters with more than 8-bit resolution and larger memory storage. In particular, 
oscilloscopes which are not limited by scope memory, such as those which can 
automatically acquire and transfer traces. For example, oscilloscopes which can be 
programmed to transfer traces out of the oscilloscope memory and continue to acquire 
traces automatically. 
To improve the security of a system, it may be important to hide or mask those 
frequencies that leak more information, hence, research into this area of efficient 




A.1 Java Code that Implements Applet Test 2 (S-box 21 Iterations) 
/* This program implements the Applet test 2 (S-box 21 iterations) 
* described in Algorithm 6.2. 
* A Java Card receives a plaintext within an APDU command and uses it to 
* calculate the result of S-box(plaintext xor key), where key is a small 
* part of the cipher key stored in the Java Card.  
* The result of the operation is written 21 times to a variable and the 






public class OperaApp extends Applet { 
 byte value[] = JCSystem.makeTransientByteArray((short)1, 
JCSystem.CLEAR_ON_DESELECT); 
 // A small part of the cipher key is set   
 private static final byte key =(byte)0xA2; 
 // AES S-box 
 private static final byte keySub[] = { 
  (byte) 0x63,(byte) 0x7C,(byte) 0x77,(byte) 0x7B, 
  (byte) 0xF2,(byte) 0x6B,(byte) 0x6F,(byte) 0xC5, 
  (byte) 0x30,(byte) 0x01,(byte) 0x67,(byte) 0x2B, 
  (byte) 0xFE,(byte) 0xD7,(byte) 0xAB,(byte) 0x76, 
  (byte) 0xCA,(byte) 0x82,(byte) 0xC9,(byte) 0x7D, 
  (byte) 0xFA,(byte) 0x59,(byte) 0x47,(byte) 0xF0, 
  (byte) 0xAD,(byte) 0xD4,(byte) 0xA2,(byte) 0xAF, 
  (byte) 0x9C,(byte) 0xA4,(byte) 0x72,(byte) 0xC0, 
  (byte) 0xB7,(byte) 0xFD,(byte) 0x93,(byte) 0x26, 
  (byte) 0x36,(byte) 0x3F,(byte) 0xF7,(byte) 0xCC, 
  (byte) 0x34,(byte) 0xA5,(byte) 0xE5,(byte) 0xF1, 
  (byte) 0x71,(byte) 0xD8,(byte) 0x31,(byte) 0x15, 
  (byte) 0x04,(byte) 0xC7,(byte) 0x23,(byte) 0xC3, 
  (byte) 0x18,(byte) 0x96,(byte) 0x05,(byte) 0x9A, 
  (byte) 0x07,(byte) 0x12,(byte) 0x80,(byte) 0xE2, 
  (byte) 0xEB,(byte) 0x27,(byte) 0xB2,(byte) 0x75, 
  (byte) 0x09,(byte) 0x83,(byte) 0x2C,(byte) 0x1A, 
  (byte) 0x1B,(byte) 0x6E,(byte) 0x5A,(byte) 0xA0, 
  (byte) 0x52,(byte) 0x3B,(byte) 0xD6,(byte) 0xB3, 
  (byte) 0x29,(byte) 0xE3,(byte) 0x2F,(byte) 0x84, 
  (byte) 0x53,(byte) 0xD1,(byte) 0x00,(byte) 0xED, 
  (byte) 0x20,(byte) 0xFC,(byte) 0xB1,(byte) 0x5B, 
  (byte) 0x6A,(byte) 0xCB,(byte) 0xBE,(byte) 0x39, 
  (byte) 0x4A,(byte) 0x4C,(byte) 0x58,(byte) 0xCF, 
  (byte) 0xD0,(byte) 0xEF,(byte) 0xAA,(byte) 0xFB, 
  (byte) 0x43,(byte) 0x4D,(byte) 0x33,(byte) 0x85, 
  (byte) 0x45,(byte) 0xF9,(byte) 0x02,(byte) 0x7F, 
  (byte) 0x50,(byte) 0x3C,(byte) 0x9F,(byte) 0xA8, 
  (byte) 0x51,(byte) 0xA3,(byte) 0x40,(byte) 0x8F, 
  (byte) 0x92,(byte) 0x9D,(byte) 0x38,(byte) 0xF5, 
  (byte) 0xBC,(byte) 0xB6,(byte) 0xDA,(byte) 0x21, 
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  (byte) 0x10,(byte) 0xFF,(byte) 0xF3,(byte) 0xD2, 
  (byte) 0xCD,(byte) 0x0C,(byte) 0x13,(byte) 0xEC, 
  (byte) 0x5F,(byte) 0x97,(byte) 0x44,(byte) 0x17, 
  (byte) 0xC4,(byte) 0xA7,(byte) 0x7E,(byte) 0x3D, 
  (byte) 0x64,(byte) 0x5D,(byte) 0x19,(byte) 0x73, 
  (byte) 0x60,(byte) 0x81,(byte) 0x4F,(byte) 0xDC, 
  (byte) 0x22,(byte) 0x2A,(byte) 0x90,(byte) 0x88, 
  (byte) 0x46,(byte) 0xEE,(byte) 0xB8,(byte) 0x14, 
  (byte) 0xDE,(byte) 0x5E,(byte) 0x0B,(byte) 0xDB, 
  (byte) 0xE0,(byte) 0x32,(byte) 0x3A,(byte) 0x0A, 
  (byte) 0x49,(byte) 0x06,(byte) 0x24,(byte) 0x5C, 
  (byte) 0xC2,(byte) 0xD3,(byte) 0xAC,(byte) 0x62, 
  (byte) 0x91,(byte) 0x95,(byte) 0xE4,(byte) 0x79, 
  (byte) 0xE7,(byte) 0xC8,(byte) 0x37,(byte) 0x6D, 
  (byte) 0x8D,(byte) 0xD5,(byte) 0x4E,(byte) 0xA9, 
  (byte) 0x6C,(byte) 0x56,(byte) 0xF4,(byte) 0xEA, 
  (byte) 0x65,(byte) 0x7A,(byte) 0xAE,(byte) 0x08, 
  (byte) 0xBA,(byte) 0x78,(byte) 0x25,(byte) 0x2E, 
  (byte) 0x1C,(byte) 0xA6,(byte) 0xB4,(byte) 0xC6, 
  (byte) 0xE8,(byte) 0xDD,(byte) 0x74,(byte) 0x1F, 
  (byte) 0x4B,(byte) 0xBD,(byte) 0x8B,(byte) 0x8A, 
  (byte) 0x70,(byte) 0x3E,(byte) 0xB5,(byte) 0x66, 
  (byte) 0x48,(byte) 0x03,(byte) 0xF6,(byte) 0x0E, 
  (byte) 0x61,(byte) 0x35,(byte) 0x57,(byte) 0xB9, 
  (byte) 0x86,(byte) 0xC1,(byte) 0x1D,(byte) 0x9E, 
  (byte) 0xE1,(byte) 0xF8,(byte) 0x98,(byte) 0x11, 
  (byte) 0x69,(byte) 0xD9,(byte) 0x8E,(byte) 0x94, 
  (byte) 0x9B,(byte) 0x1E,(byte) 0x87,(byte) 0xE9, 
  (byte) 0xCE,(byte) 0x55,(byte) 0x28,(byte) 0xDF, 
  (byte) 0x8C,(byte) 0xA1,(byte) 0x89,(byte) 0x0D, 
  (byte) 0xBF,(byte) 0xE6,(byte) 0x42,(byte) 0x68, 
  (byte) 0x41,(byte) 0x99,(byte) 0x2D,(byte) 0x0F, 
  (byte) 0xB0,(byte) 0x54,(byte) 0xBB,(byte) 0x16}; 
    
public static void install(byte[] bArray, short bOffset, byte bLength) { 
  // GP-compliant Java Card applet registration 
  new OperaApp() 
  .register(bArray, (short) (bOffset + 1), bArray[bOffset]); 
} 
 public void process(APDU apdu) { 
  // Good practice: Return 9000 on SELECT 
  if (selectingApplet()) { 
   return; 
  } 
  // Read the APDU command 
  byte[] buf = apdu.getBuffer(); 
  // Initialize a variable where the result of the s-box 
  // operation will be stored 
  byte v=0; 
  // Compute Value=SubByte(P xor k) 
  value[0]= (byte)(keySub[(int)(buf[2]^key)&0xff]); 
  // Stores the result of the S-box in to the variable for 
  // 21 times 
  // To avoid any overhead related with "For" loops and 
  // conditional operations the values of v are explicitly 
  .// assigned 
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  v=value[0] ; //1 
  // For the Apple test 1 (s-box one iteration) here starts 
  // the response 
  // For the Apple test 2 (s-box 21 iterations) 20 cycles of 
  // clearing and writing are perform 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //2 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //3 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //4 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //5 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //6 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //7 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //8 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //9 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //10 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //11 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //12 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //13 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //14 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //15 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //16 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //17 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //18 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //19 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //20 
  v=0; 
  v=value[0] ; //21 
  // Sends the result of the s-box operation to the card 
  // reader 
  // (The following 3 lines were commented when measuring  
  // the times in table 6.1)  
  apdu.setOutgoing(); 
  apdu.setOutgoingLength((short)1); 
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